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Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act:




Of all the personal narratives about individuals with disa-
bilities1 and employment, one of the most revealing is that of
the well-dressed business traveler, sitting in an airport in her
wheelchair with a styrofoam cup full of coffee in her hand.
Along comes another traveler, who smiles at her, and then
drops a quarter into the cup.2
The story is hardly the most outrageous example of mis-
treatment of persons with disabilities. 3 After all, the person
dropping the quarter into the cup caused no physical harm be-
yond the splashing; in fact, he was motivated by human sympa-
thy and genuinely wanted to help. More telling about the story
is its illustration of the stereotyped assumption that a person
with a disability in an airport is begging, not working, and
needs a contribution (a very small one, in this case) to survive.
The prevalence of the assumption is not an insurmountable
problem. As time goes on, if persons with disabilities are inte-
t © Mark Weber 1998. Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B. Columbia,
1975; J.D. Yale, 1978. I thank Martha Minow, Laura Rothstein, and Steven Greenberger
for their comments on an early draft of this Article. I also thank my research assistants,
Joel Dabisch, Lar Cleary, and Andrew Bryant.
1. The usage "people with disabilities" or "individual with a disability" may seem
awkward at first, but it carries an important message of putting the person first and the
disabling condition second. Accordingly, it is the usage embodied in the Americans with
Disabilities Act and other recent statutes. See 42 US.C. § 12111(8) (1994); see also Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). See generally RoLANO
W. BuRms, MANUAL OF STYLE FOR DEPICTING PERSONS wITH DISABILITIES 2 (State of Illi-
nois, nd.) (discussing terminology).
2. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 19 (1993). This work is full of accounts of similar events. A collection
of personal stories drawn from caselaw is found in LAURA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 1-4 (1995). Accounts drawn from historical sources are
found in RUTH CoLBE, DmAmrY LAW. CASES AND MATERIALS 3-18 (1995).




grated into the working economy, the would-be patron will ob-
serve the difference and change attitudes. What is more vexing
is that at present, for all too many persons with disabilities, the
assumption is true. Persons with disabilities are not working in
the numbers that they want to be, or in the numbers that re-
flect their representation in the national population.4 As a re-
sult, they are disproportionately poor and very much dependent
on private and public subsidies.5
Both discriminatory exclusion and limits on competitiveness
stemming from disability itself prevent people with disabilities
from working. Discrimination comes in the form of the stereo-
types held by the donor of the quarter, and in other more and
less subtle forms.6 Competitive limits consist of the difficulties
that physical and mental disabilities impose on an individual
vying for employment in the marketplace. Even without discrim-
ination, persons who have impairments in their abilities to do
major functions of life will be at a disadvantage selling their
time to employers.
7
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the need for a
national employment policy for persons with disabilities, and to
sketch the outlines of such a policy. The need arises from pov-
erty and unemployment caused by discrimination and competi-
tive disadvantage. Existing legal remedies embodied in the
Americans with Disabilities Act and other laws," though benefi-
cial, do not eliminate the problem; despite existing education
and training efforts, unemployment and poverty linger.
A more effective solution lies beyond the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The remedy for continuing conscious and un-
conscious discrimination is to supplement existing nondiscrimi-
nation law with strengthened affirmative action obligations to
hire and promote persons with disabilities, and to expand those
obligations from federal agencies and contractors to the rest of
American employers. Given the economic limits that disabilities
impose, however, such measures will not be sufficient. The solu-
tion for competitive disadvantage is an even more ambitious
program consisting of non-remedial employment setasides, first
by government, but ultimately by all employers. Together these
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-20.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-54.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
8. The principal federal laws are the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42




steps will constitute the beginnings of an effective national em-
ployment policy for persons with disabilities.
This Article brings together a number of the disparate
strands in the legal literature on disability and develops several
themes the literature has left unexplored and unconnected.
Commentaries on the existing affirmative action provisions of
the Rehabilitation Act are sparse,9 and do not consider the pos-
sibility of the extending the provisions to nonfederal employ-
ment. Comparative law sources note that European countries
and Japan compel employers to hire specified percentages of
persons with disabilities.10 Some of the authorities have sug-
gested that a comparable American program would be desira-
ble.1" Nevertheless, no source has fully examined the justifica-
tions for such a plan and answered the likely objections to it.
For their part, the sources discussing the European quota pro-
grams do not draw any connections to existing American affirm-
ative action provisions.
In the flush of excitement over the passage of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, most commentators focused on the
specific provisions of the Act;' 2 the topics of federal affirmative
9. Jonathan S. Leonard, Disability Policy and the Return to Work, in DISABUY &
WORK 46, 51-54 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed. 1991) (noting absence of priority on enforcing
section 503 duties); Kathryn W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duty Under the Rehabilita-
tion Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment,
67 TML L REV. 781 (1989); Russell Baker, Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qual-
ified Handicapped Individuals, 49 S. CAL L REv. 785 (1976) (arguing that the provi-
sions, by analogy to current racial affirmative action plans, should include job goals and
timetables). Two more recent sources are treatises: LAuRA ROTHsmIN. DIsABnms AND
THE LAW § 4.04-.09 (1992); BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSSEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
PERSONS wrrH DIsaBrTnms 9:1-:51 (1990 & Supp. 1995). A useful compact source is BON-
Nm PorrRAs TucKER, FEDERAL DIS waB Y LAw IN A NurSHELL 48-61 (1994).
10. See infra sources cited in notes 227-39.
11. See, eg., Richard V. Burkhauser, Lessons from the West German Approach to
Disability Policy, in DISAnaITY & WORK 85, 88 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991); Eric A.
Besner, Comment, Employment Legislation for Disabled Individuals, What Can France
Learn from the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 16 CoP. LAB. LJ. 399, 418-19 (1995).
12. See, eg., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. CIL-C.L L, REv.
413 (1991); Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integra-
tion, 64 TEMP. L REv. 393 (1991); Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected- Evaluating ̂ Un-
due Hardship' Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA LJ. 1 (1990);
G. William Davenport, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major
Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 ALA. L REv. 307 (1992); Rus-
sell EL Gardner & Carolyn J. Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to the Reasona-
ble Accommodation Requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 7 LAB.
LAw. 37 (1991); Charles D. Goldman, Americans with Disabilities Act: Dispelling the
Myths, 27 U. RicH. L REv. 73 (1992); W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limita-
tion on the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of Social
1998]
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action programs and setasides along European lines have been
neglected. Nevertheless, even the most optimistic commentators
on the new federal law tempered their enthusiasm with the rec-
ognition that its antidiscrimination measures would leave many
persons with disabilities out of the work force and, conse-
quently, out of most of economic life in America. 3 Similarly,
prominent authorities on the Rehabilitation Act14 have noted
Justice, 22 N.M. REv. 295 (1992); Charles P. Gurd, Whether a Genetic Defect Is a Disa-
bility Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1 ANN. HEALTH L. 107 (1992); Loretta
K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities and
Psychoactive Substance Abuse Disorders Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 43 J. URBAN & CoNTEmp. L 343 (1993); Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 149 (1992); Michael B. Laudor, Disability and
Community: Modes of Exclusion, Norms of Inclusion, and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 43 SYRAcusE L. REv. 929 (1992); Arline Mayerson, Title I-Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEP. L REv. 499 (1991); Stephen
L. Mikochik, The Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Some First Im-
pressions, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 619 (1991); John J. Sarno, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: Federal Mandate to Create and Integrated Society, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS J. 401
(1993); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U. ILL. L. RMv. 923
(1989); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Title I and
Its Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 VT. L. REV. 263 (1991); C. Geoffrey Weirich, Rea-
sonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 7 LAB. LAw. 27
(1991). Student commentary also abounds. See, eg., Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Over-
coming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1991); James
C. Dugan, Note, The Conflict Between Disabling and Enabling Paradigms in Law: Steril-
ization, the Developmentally Disabled, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
78 CoRNELL L. REv. 507 (1993); James V. Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 68 NOmT DAME L REv. 581 (1993); Kathleen D.
Henry, Note, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Employment Setting, 54 ALB. L. REv.
123 (1989); Lisa L. Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable
Small Businesses?, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1135 (1991); Edward J. McGraw, Note, Com-
pliance Costs of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 DEL J. CoRP. L. 521 (1993);
Bryan P. Neal, Note, The Proper Standard for Risk of Future Injury Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 46 SMU L REv. 483 (1992); Timothy A. Ogden, Note, Shifting
Burdens and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 IND. L. REV. 179 (1995).
13. A number of commentators have noted extensive compliance problems with fed-
eral laws and myths about individuals with disabilities which pose significant barriers to
full employment. See, eg., Goldman, supra note 12, at 83; McGraw, supra note 12, at
536; Jean Fitzpatrick Galanos & Stephen H. Price, Comment, Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 21 STETSON L. REv. 931 (1992); see also Tucker, supra note
12, at 925 ('The ADA represents a series of compromises between advocates of disabled
people and the business community.").
14. Significant academic commentary exists with respect to section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. See, ag., Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a
Causal Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HoFsusA L REv. 237 (1989); Michael A. Rebell,
Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEo. L.J. 1435 (1986);
BEYOND THE ADA
that even if that law were to be interpreted properly and en-
forced aggressively, huge gaps in employment and other aspects
of economic participation would remain."
Part I of this Article describes the unemployment and con-
sequent poverty of the bulk of the population with disabilities. It
traces the conditions to continuing discrimination-particularly
unconscious discrimination and stereotypes-as well as to the
competitive limits imposed by physical and mental impairments.
Part II discusses the inadequacy of existing measures to im-
prove the employment picture for persons with disabilities. Part
III describes the role that affirmative action should play in com-
bating discrimination, discussing the proper interpretation of ex-
isting affirmative action statutes and proposing steps to promote
their enforceability and expansion to the parts of the national
economy they do not now cover. Part IV addresses employment
problems other than discrimination, proposing a regime of non-
remedial setasides of jobs, by the national government, other
governmental employers, and ultimately by private industry.
I. THE EcoNOMIc EXCLUSION OF PERSONS wrrIH DISABLITIEs
People with disabilities exist on the margins of American
economic life, largely outside of the world of work and with little
disposable income. Discrimination is to blame, but real limits on
economic competitiveness play a role as well.
A. Poverty, Work, and People with Disabilities
People with disabilities are poor. Of adults with disabilities,
fifty-nine percent live in households with earnings of $25,000 or
less, while for adults without disabilities, less than forty percent
do.16 The poverty rate for adults with disabilities is three times
Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Op-
portunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 69 CORNELL I REV. 401 (1984); Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handi-
capped" The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U. L REv. 881 (1980); Martha T. McCluskey, Note, Rethinking Equality and Differ-
ence: Disability Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 YALE LJ. 863 (1988); Note,
Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504: An Essay on Le-
gal Evasiveness, 97 HARv. L REV. 997 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Evasiveness].
15. See, eg., Wegner, supra note 14. This commentary on section 504 notes that the
law is multifaceted but concedes that even its diverse attacks on exclusion, denial of
benefits, and discrimination, will not achieve functional equality for persons with disa-
bilities in the spheres in which the law operates. The steps proposed in this Article rec-
ognize that reality.
16. Survey Shows Disabled Adults Still Earn Less, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 21,
1998]
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that of the rest of the population. 17 The explanation for the pov-
erty is obvious: persons with disabilities are not employed. Only
thirty-one percent of persons with disabilities age 16 to 64 work
part- or full-time; this number has actually decreased since
1986.18
People with disabilities want to work. A survey cited in the
legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act re-
ported that two-thirds of working age persons with disabilities
who do not have jobs say that they want to work.19 A more re-
cent survey by the Harris polling organization reported that of
persons who identified themselves as having disabilities who
were not working and were ages 16 to 64, seventy-nine percent
said that they would prefer to be working.20
The most obvious reason that people with disabilities need
to work is the money. Although the Social Security Disability In-
surance and Supplemental Security Income programs guarantee
a subsistence income to persons with total, long-term disabili-
ties,2 1 only employment gives individuals enough money to par-
1994, at C1 (reporting Louis Harris Survey for the National Organization on Disability).
17. Law Banning Job Bias Against Disabled Expected to Have a Significant Impact,
STAR-TRiBUNE (Minneapolis-St.Paul), July 19, 1992, at 24A (citing data from the Disabil-
ity Statistics Program, University of San Francisco; reporting poverty rate of 23% of
adults with disabilities).
18. Steven A. Holmes, In 4 Years, Disabilities Act Hasn't Improved Jobs Rate, N.Y.
Tims, Oct. 23, 1994, at A22 (describing study by National Organization on Disabilities).
Other sources report similar numbers. A sex-specific study found that between 1991 and
1993 the proportion of men with disabilities in the work force dropped from 3405 to
30.2%. Daniel Seligman, More Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, July 10, 1995, at 212
(reporting study conducted by Anthony Gamboa of Vocational Econometrics, Inc.). The
employment of women with disabilities also declined, from 25.9% to 23.6%. James Law-
less, Disabilities Act Marks Decline in Hiring Rate, THE PLAN DEALER (Cleveland), May
1, 1995, at 2B (reporting same survey). The declines may or may not be meaningful. The
population with disabilities is aging with the rest of the population, perhaps affecting
workforce participation, and the economy in the early 1990s was difficult for persons
with disabilities and without.
19. HR. REP. No. 101-485, at 32 (1990) (citing THE ICF SuravEr OF DIsABLED AMEm-
CANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAiNsRAM 47-50).
20. Lous HARRis & Assocs., N.O.JHARRis SuRVEY OF AMERICANS wrr DmABnxriEs
55 (1994). A recent survey in a large state found that 72% of persons with disabilities
who are unemployed want to work. Minette McGhee, Justice Is Blind-For One Day:
Court Gets Lesson on Disability, Cni. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at 22.
21. The principal sources of income for persons with disabilities who do not work
are the Social Security Disability Insurance program, which provides an income based
on prior earnings levels (and thus levels of payroll tax contributions) to persons with to-
tal disabilities expected to last a year or more. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994). Persons who
have not worked in covered employment for a sufficient time before becoming disabled
may receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a flat amount now set at $484 per
month if they meet the same disability and duration standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382
[Vol. 46
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ticipate fully in the life of the community.22 Within the world of
work, the monetary advantage lies with jobs from ordinary em-
ployers. Employment in the general workforce yields far greater
monetary benefits than work in sheltered workshops, even when
the additional costs of job-coaching or otherwise supporting the
individual are subtracted from the worker's salary.23
Work, however, gives rewards beyond its wages. It brings
the individual an identity, a niche in society,2 and sources of
friendship and social support.25 Work contributes to self-esteem
by conferring a sense of mastery over the environment and reaf-
firming to the worker that he or she is making a contribution to
society26 One's sense of self-worth is enhanced by the knowledge
that one has succeeded at work and by others' recognition of
that success. 27 Work helps individuals order their lives; those
who are chronically unemployed frequently experience attitudi-
nal deterioration even when they have adequate economic
resources.2
(1994). See generally Mark C. Weber, Social Security: Law Pertaining to Evaluation of
Mental Impairments, in THE ILLINOIS MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL'S LAW HANDBOOK
(Leila Foster ed., 1993) (discussing the structure of the Disability Insurance and SSI
programs). Some additional sources of income may be available for children with severe
disabilities who are in specialized placements. See generally Mark C. Weber, Legal Advo-
cacy for Medically Complex Children in Foster Care, in THE MEDIcALLY COMPLEX CHILD:
THE TRANSMON TO HomE CARE 231-43 (Nefl Hochstadt & Diane Yost eds., 1991). Subsis-
tence benefits are also available for veterans with severe disabilities. See 38 U.S.C.
§ 1114 (1994). Private pensions and insurance may also provide income for persons with
disabilities, as may workers' compensation. See infra note 61 (discussing interplay of
programs to return workers with disabilities to work and workers' compensation costs).
22. The position has been advanced that welfare programs tend- to trap individuals
in a low-income underclass, and are therefore less desirable than measures that lead to
integration into the work force. See David E. Bernstein, Roots of the Underclass: The De-
cline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AU.
L. REV. 85, 119-36 (1993) (discussing the effect of New Deal labor and welfare enact-
ments on African-Americans).
23. Robert Baer et al., A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Supported Employment
for Persons with Severe Physical and Multiple Disabilities, 18 J. REHABLIATION ADMIN.
46, 51 (1994).
24. Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd W, Matson recognized this point at the conclusion
of their seminal article on the theory of the public law of disability, The Disabled and
the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL L REv. 809, 840 (1966), in which they argued for law reform
directed towards employment opportunity and self-support as a means of achieving full
integration of people with disabilities.
25. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, SEC'Y OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 4
(1973) [hereinafter WORK IN AMFRCA]
26. Id. at 4-5.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 7-9.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The presence of persons with disabilities in the workplace
also benefits society as a whole. First, exposure to human beings
who do not in all ways conform to the norm is crucial to dispel-
ling myths about individuals with disabilities.2 9 Individuals who
are not in the workplace and other places where people carry on
business and recreational activities are not part of the con-
sciousness of those who are there. In a real sense, people with
disabilities who are not integrated into society are invisible to
the rest of society.30 This invisibility fosters social attitudes of
fear and condescension. Integration fosters realistic attitudes,
demonstrating that persons with disabilities are not threaten-
ing, helpless, or evil.31 Society at large benefits when false fears
die out and truth prevails.
Second, persons who are employed contribute to the social
product of the economy and pay tax dollars into the treasury
rather than drawing subsistence payments from the government
or insurers.3 2 Although relief programs provide benefits that are
much smaller than incomes from employment, their cost to soci-
ety as a whole is huge. The cost of maintaining persons who are
now thirty-five years old on Supplemental Security Income or
Social Security Disability Insurance and associated medical and
other benefits for the rest of their lives is slightly more than one
trillion dollars.33 The government spends thirty billion dollars a
year on these benefits; roughly the same amount is spent on
medical assistance for persons with disabilities.34 After reciting
these figures, an evaluation specialist for the United States De-
29. Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT.
L REV. 71, 72 (1978).
30. Id. at 71 (discussing RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952)).
31. See id. (discussing integration of children with disabilities into public school);
see also Michael B. Laudor, Disability and Community: Modes of Exclusion, Norms of In-
clusion, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 43 SYRACuSE L RV. 929, 943
(1992) ("TIhe more the members of our American community see the disabled included
among us, the closer we will get to the truly substantive change the ADA only begins to
address.:); Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAvis L Rav. 349, 364 (1990)
(discussing aspirations of framers of Education for All Handicapped Children Act);
Daniel H. Melvin, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL
L REv. 599, 617 (1995) (same). Exposure to persons with disabilities in the workplace
may also dispel myths about the reasonability of expecting persons with disabilities to
have superhuman abilities to compensate for physical or mental impairments.
32. See Harlan Hahn, Equality and the Environment: The Interpretation of TMeason-
able Accommodations" in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. RsHAILrrATION Ai.
MIN. 101, 105 (1993) (describing an end to discrimination as the most cost-effective
means of reducing public and private costs of disability).
33. Martin H. Gerry, supra note 11, at 89.
34. Id. at 92 (citing statistics from United States Social Security Administration).
[Vol. 46130
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partment of Health and Human Services concluded: "[Ilt costs a
lot of money to dribble out sub-poverty level benefits to a sub-
stantial number of people for a long period of time. Were we a
private insurer, we would be... trying to reduce the likelihood
of our having to spend all that money."35 Paid employment for
individuals with disabilities is the solution.
B. Reasons for Exclusion from Employment
What keeps people with disabilities out of the working econ-
omy is a combination of discrimination on the part of employers
and difficulties with being fully competitive even when no dis-
crimination takes place.
1. Discrimination. In employment, as in other fields of
human endeavor, persons with disabilities have been the object
of fear and hostility36 In the first half of this century, with the
Eugenics movement still strong, hospitals and doctors routinely
denied children with severe disabilities necessary medical treat-
ment, leaving them to die.37 More recently, people with disabili-
ties have been kept from employment, recreation, transporta-
tion, and shopping, simply because they were different from
others.3 Potential employers have more negative attitudes about
persons with disabilities than about ethnic minorities, elderly
job applicants, or ex-convicts. 9 Some employer conduct is based
on predictions that consumers harbor prejudice or stereotypes,
but employers in fact possess less favorable attitudes about how
consumers will react to employees with disabilities than the con-
35. Id.; see also Susan Harrigan, Welcome to Work, NEWSDAY (New York), July 26,
1992, at 68 (reporting estimate by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that
eliminating disability discrimination in employment would generate $386 million annu-
ally in decreased government support, productivity gains, and increased tax revenue).
36. A number of sources describe this condition at greater length. See Burgdorf,
supra note 12, at 418; Cook, supra note 12, at 399-409; Tucker, supra note 12, at 924-26.
37. See Cook, supra note 12, at 403 n.74 (citing contemporary accounts from around
the United States).
38. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989) (exclusion of persons from auction house be-
cause of appearance of disabling condition); H REP. No. 101-485,pt. 11, at 30 (1989)
(example of woman with arthritis kept from job teaching college because of her appear-
ance; individual fired from job because her son had AIDS); 135 CoNG. REc. S10,720
(1989) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger) (denial of job to women with cerebral palsy be-
cause of potential co-workers' discomfort); Joseph P. Shapiro, Liberation Day for the Dis-
abled, U.S. NEws & WoRL REP., Sept. 18, 1989, at 20 (refusal of transportation for indi-
viduals in wheelchairs).
39. William G. Johnson, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination Against Handi-
capped Workers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease, in DIsABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKE 242,
245 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds. 1986) (citing studies).
1998]
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sumers themselves do.40 Prejudice starts at a young age.41 Atti-
tudinal surveys show that children with disabilities are the
least-liked and the lowest in social prestige among their
classmates. 42
It was not until 1973 that the City of Chicago repealed its
ordinance prohibiting persons who were "deformed" and "un-
sightly" from exposing themselves to public view on the
streets. 43 The spirit of the ordinance, however, lives on else-
where. In the mass products liability trial concerning birth de-
fects said to result from fetal exposure to the anti-nausea drug
Bendectin, the judge excluded all plaintiffs with visible deformi-
ties from the courtroom, on the ground that their appearance
might excite passions against the defendant." What Jacobus
tenBroek termed "the right to live in the world" was thus taken
away from human beings who suffered disabling injuries on the
grounds that their very disabilities were too horrible to be on
display.45 The essence of invidious discrimination is being
treated worse than others because of a trait that one has no
control over and that has no just relation to the entitlement at
issue.'5 Few things could be more unfair than being excluded
40. Alexander J. Bolla, Jr., Distributive Justice and the Physically Disable& Myth
and Reality, 48 Mo. L. REv. 983, 989 (1983) (reporting results of study of lawyer
recruiters and potential clients about attitudes towards lawyers with disabilities).
41. For a parent of young children who watch televised cartoons, one of most strik-
ing facts about the "entertainment! is that every villain has a physical or mental disabil-
ity or both. It is the way contemporary culture has of showing evil visually. In this re-
gard, it is interesting to note that the hopelessly revisionist Disney movie of "The
Hunchback of Notre Dame" retains the eponymous physical abnormality of the original
character while rendering him suitably cuddly in other ways.
42. Paul Sale & Doris M. Carey, The Sociometric Status of Students with Disabili-
ties in a Full-Inclusion School, 62 EXCEPTIONAL CHEDREN 6, 16-17 (1995) (reporting re-
suits of study). Unfortunately, this conclusion applies even when the children have not
been identified as eligible for special education services and even when the children are
educated in regular education classrooms. Id. at 17. Specific strategies are needed to
draw children with disabilities and those without disabilities closer together. Carolyn S.
Cooper & Mary A. McEvoy, Group Friendship Activities, TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHIL-
DaRN, Spring 1996, at 67.
43. CHICAGO, ILL, CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1973) (cited in McCluskey, supra
note 14, at 863 n.8). There are numerous examples of private enterprises and govern-
ment officials refusing to serve individuals because they felt the persons' disabilities
made their appearance upsetting to others. See, eg., S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989) (re-
fusal of private zoo to admit children with Down's syndrome for fear of upsetting the an-
imals; exclusion of children with cerebral palsy from school because the child's appear-
ance was said to have a "nauseating effectr on other children).
44. See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
45. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
7brts, 54 CAL L REV. 841 (1966).
46. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L REv. 235,
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from the judicial proceeding that could bring closure to a per-
sonal disaster on the ground that the disaster left one unfit to
be in the presence of justice.47
Not all disability discrimination is intentional. Much is the
result of unconscious attitudes or unexamined stereotypes. Un-
intentional discrimination is pervasive.48 Stereotypes and
prejudices grow easily in the absence of day-to-day contact with
human beings who are different. Research shows that employers
who have no employees with disabilities have more negative at-
titudes towards workers with disabilities than those who have
moderate or large numbers.49 Many courts ° and commentators51
have observed that discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties stems as much from ignorance, fear, or a misplaced concern
for the persons' well-being as from intentional discrimination.
Statistics about complaints filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission support the inference that ste-
reotypes now keep many individuals with disabilities out of the
workplace. The vast bulk of complaints are filed by those who
already are, or recently were, employed.52 The two forms of disa-
bility discrimination that lead the statistics are those related to
back problems and mental health problems.5 3 Both forms of dis-
241 (1971) (examining the unfairness of discriminatory employment decisions).
47. The plaintiffs were relegated to a separate room in the courthouse in which they
could watch proceedings over closed-circuit television. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at
296. A case affirming that parties should never be excluded from the trial because of
physical abnormalities related to the litigation is Helminaki v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766
F.2d 208, 217 (6th Cir. 1985).
48. Sara D. Watson, Applying Theory to Practice: A Prospective and Prescriptive
Analysis of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 J. DsmABIT=Y
POL'Y STUD. 1, 7 (1994) (collecting and evaluating attitudinal studies).
49. Sharon E. Walters & Clora Mae Baker, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Employer and Recruiter Attitudes Toward Individuals with Disabilities, 20 J. REMA-
BDI=iATION ADmN. 15, 20 (1996) (contrasting score on test instrument of employer repre-
sentatives with varying degrees of contact with employees with disabilities).
50. See, eg., School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (referring to 'society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295
(1985) ('Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most
often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indiffer-
ence . .. .'); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cia
1981).
5L See, e-g., Rebell, supra note 14, at 1437, 1449; Garvey, supra note 12, at 582.
52. The majority of cases are discharge claims-35,350 claims since 1992, or 5L6%.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Come'N, CUMULATIVE ADA CHARGE DATA, JULY 26.
1992-JUNE 30, 1996 (July 13, 1996) (on file with author). The pattern here supports
Judge Friendlys point that people are more likely to be concerned over the loss of some-
thing they have than the failure to get something they want. Henry Friendly, Some
ind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L Rv. 1267, 1296 (1975).
53. Back impairments are the most cited for the 1992-96 period, with 12,520 cases,
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ability are ones that are frequently not visible when the em-
ployee is hired. More obvious forms of disability, such as mobil-
ity impairments, are far behind, an indication that the
individuals never made it through the employer's door.54 This
subtle discrimination will be difficult to overcome.
2. Limits on Economic Competitiveness. A disability means
a limit on major life activity.5" Not all disabilities prevent per-
sons from achieving full economic productivity, but most do.
Bertrand Russell once observed that all human work consists of
altering the position of matter relative to other matter, or di-
recting other people to do so.56 Limits on the ability to move, to
carry, to push, to pull, all make an individual less competitive
than an individual who does not have those limits, as do any
limits on mental or communicative powers that prevent an indi-
vidual from being as effective as others in directing production
processes. Although technological advances will provide more
employment opportunities for persons with disabilities whose in-
telligence and education place them above or on a par with
other persons, they will exacerbate the difficulties of those per-
sons with limits on mental and some sensory capacities.
These facts bear out the proposition that disability is
largely socially determined.57 In a society in which few could
read and reading was unimportant to most economic activity,
persons with dyslexia were not disabled. In some future society
in which machines do all the physical labor, those with physical
impairments will not have a disability. But in society as it is
now constituted, either mental or physical disability makes a
potential job candidate less desirable than a candidate who does
or 18.4% of the total. Emotional and psychiatric impairments are next, with 8536, or
12.6%. Neurological impairments are involved in 11.3% of cases, amounting to 7,712 in-
stances. EQUAL EMPLOYxENT OPPoRTuNrry COMIN, CUMuuTmvE ADA CHARGE DATA, July
26, 1992-June 30, 1996 (July 13, 1996) (on file with author).
54. Mardi L. Solomon, Is the ADA 'Accessible' to People with Disabilities?, 17 J. RE-
HABILTATION ADMIN. 109, 115 (1993) (discussing interpretations of complaint statistics).
55. This definition is embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act itself, 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2XA) (1994).
56. The entire quotation is: "Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of mat-
ter at or near the earth's surface relative to such other matter, second, telling other peo-
ple to do so. The first is unpleasant and ill paid; the second pleasant and highly paid."
Bertrand Russell, quoted in Matthew Parris, Call That Work? There Should Be a Law
Against It, Political Sketch, THE TIMEs (London), Feb. 18, available in 1993 WL
10557188.
57. See, eg., McCluskey, supra note 14, at 873; see also Martha Minow, The Su-
preme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword" Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L REv. 10, 14 n.19
(1987) (describing human role in creating physical barriers).
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not have the disability, when all other characteristics of the ap-
plicants are the same.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF PRESENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT ECONOMIC
EXCLUSION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILrTIEs
Neither existing antidiscrimination laws nor existing educa-
tional and training efforts have succeeded in bringing persons
with disabilities into the economic mainstream. An examination
of these measures shows that there is little reason to expect
that they will be fully successful in that regard.
A. The Marginal Role of Antidiscrimination Measures
Commentators have praised the Americans with Disabilities
Act for its bans on intentional discrimination, screening, segre-
gation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. These
praises, however, are merited only if the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act is fully enforced as written. There remains the possi-
bility that the Act will not be fully enforced. The Act requires
employers to conduct themselves to the detriment of their eco-
nomic self-interest. Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which requires merely that employers behave rationally
by hiring the candidate who can do the job most effectively and
cheaply irrespective of race, religion, national origin or sex,58 the
Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to lay out
greater costs for the group of workers it protects than for the in-
dividuals who are competing with them.59 The costs generally
58. Debate exists on this proposition, with some commentators claiming that the
law against race and sex discrimination requires employers who would not otherwise do
so to behave in their own best interest, against their irrational prejudices. See, eg., John
J. Donohue, Is Title WI Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L REv. 1411 (1986) (noting temporal dy-
namics of the legislation). Others claim that employers who discriminate will eventually
go out of business anyway, because of the economic irrationality of refusing to hire the
best person irrespective of irrational considerations. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, The The-
ory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMNATION IN LABoR MARKETs 3, 10 (Orley Ashenfelter &
Albert Rees eds., 1973). Some also argue that fear of unfounded charges of discrimina-
tion encourages irrational hiring decisions by employers who would otherwise hire the
best candidate irrespective of race and sex. See, e.g., RicHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPOYMENT DSCRNATION LAws 78 (1992). Still others
note that a rational, unprejudiced employer might still have an incentive to discriminate
because of irrational preferences on the part of consumers and co-workers, and that the
law may have an effect by keeping employers from pandering to prejudices of others.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U.
CHL L REV. 1311, 1319 (1989).
59. Edward J. McGraw, Note, Compliance Costs of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 18 DEL J. CoRP. L. 521, 536 (1993) ("[lf the only difference between two applicants
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are modest,60 but they do exist.61
To change the calculus of employers' self-interest, managers
will need to be convinced that the risks of liability outweigh the
economic costs of compliance with the law. 62 It is unclear
whether and when awards of damages will create this shift.
Some authorities have expressed pessimism about voluntary
compliance with the Act, citing empirical evidence that neither
employers nor persons with disabilities know about the legal
standards,63 that some subgroups of persons with disabilities
tend to be passive regarding legal rights matters,64 and that at-
titudinal change among employers takes time.65 Others have
stressed that employers view the law favorably and are comply-
ing voluntarily, but these sources tend to draw from limited
samples. 66 Broader samplings reveal widespread ignorance of
the law and the absence of expectations by employers that they
will hire more employees with disabilities as a result of the
Act.67 Statistical evidence on the success of the law to date re-
is that one has a disability requiring an accommodation.... it would be economically
prudent to hire the non-disabled person in order to avoid the cost.").
60. PETER D. BLANcF, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS wITH DSB srrES ACT, TRAN-
SCENDING COMPLIANCE: A CASE REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co. 12 (1994) (reporting
that of 436 accommodations for persons with disabilities at Sears, 69% had no cost and
28% cost less than $1000).
61. There are, however, some countervailing savings. For example, returning cur-
rent workers to the job after disabling on-the-job injuries may drastically reduce work-
ers' compensation costs. James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health
Histories of Current Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REmii-
ITATON ADMIN. 83, 86 (1993) (describing $310,000 annual savings for one company and
$4 million savings for another from programs of rapidly returning previously injured
workers to the job with necessary accommodations). More importantly, the goal of the
Americans with Disabilities Act is fair treatment, not a narrow cost-benefit analysis or
efficiency as that term is applied in neoclassical economics. See Crespi, supra note 12, at
24-35.
62. Mark C. Weber, Comment on Casper, Seasons of Change, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Implementation in the Work Place, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADIN. 135
(1993).
63. Solomon, supra note 54, at 110-13 (reporting empirical study).
64. Paul Leung, Minorities with Disabilities and the Americans With Disabilities
Act: A Promise Yet to Be Fulfilled, 17 J. REHABILITATION AmuN. 92, 95-96 (1993)
65. See Marta W. Casper, Seasons of Change, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Implementation in the Work Place, 17 J. REHABLrATION ADIN. 129, 132 (1993) (describ-
ing continuing attitudinal barriers to hiring of persons with disabilities despite two
years since passage of Americans with Disabilities Act).
66. See BLANcK, supra note 60, at 6-7 (summary account of success in accommodat-
ing employees with disabilities at Sears, Roebuck).
67. John F. Newman & Roxan E. Dinwoodie, Impact of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act on Private Sector Employers, 20 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 3 (1996) (reporting




Stereotyping is particularly hard to overcome. Attitudes
about disability and employment are notoriously difficult to
change.69 Although law influences attitudes, the influence may
take significant time to manifest itself in social conduct.
70 If
prejudices keep individuals with disabilities away from those
without them, the very stereotypes that led to the exclusion are
unlikely to be challenged.
Even if the Act is fully enforced, the beneficiaries will not
be all persons with disabilities. They will be those persons
whose work is superior to that of other job candidates once the
reasonable accommodations have been put into place, or those
who overcompensate for their disabilities or who do not really
have disabilities but are merely perceived as disabled or stereo-
typed as disabled. The fact, however, is that a disability is a dis-
ability. It limits one's ability to do something important. Limits
on workplace productivity are an inherent part of many disa-
bling conditions.
For this reason, although the Americans with Disabilities
Act can be expected to promote the employment and general in-
tegration of persons with disabilities, expectations should not be
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N1M. L. Rzv. 119, 225-
26 (1992) (study of 47 employers; noting one previous study with contrasting findings);
see also Rick Douglas, The Americans with Disabilities Act After Three Years: Where Are
We?, 4 J. VOCATIONAL REHABEIrrATION 153, 154 ("Yet, despite all the information distrib-
uted to business, study after study confirms that as high as forty percent of the business
community has not taken action to implement the ADA.).
68. See sources cited supra note 18. But see Great Lakes Disability and Business
Technical Assistance Center, Employment Rate of People with Disabilities Increases
Since Enactment of ADA, REGION V NEWS, Summer, 1996, at 1 (reporting studies by
Census Bureau that show increases in employment of persons with severe disabilities
from 1991 to 1994). A serious difficulty with resolving the questions about the effective-
ness of the Americans with Disabilities Act is that surveys are often poorly designed, so
that a person who is working is unlikely to designate himself or herself as a person with
a disability. See Corinne Kirchner, Looking Under the Street Lamp: Inappropriate Uses
of Measures Just Because They Are There, 7 J. DISAnILrr POLY STU). 77 (1996) (criticiz-
ing various studies of employment of people with disabilities).
69. See Casper, supra note 65, at 132 (describing continuing attitudinal barriers to
hiring of persons with disabilities despite two years since passage of Americans with
Disabilities Act); Bolla, supra note 40, at 990 (reporting government study concluding
that aggressive action to enforce disability discrimination law may promote negative at-
titudes towards persons with disabilities); see also Watson, supra note 48, at 7 ("Ending
discrimination against people with disabilities means proscribing deeply rooted and long-
held fears about people with disabilities').
70. See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in




too high.71 The effect of the Act is marginal, in a rather literal
sense of the term. Employers are still able to hire any employee
without a disability who can do the essential functions of a job
marginally better than a person with a disability can, as long as
that person has received reasonable accommodations. 72 If the
law is followed, the employees with disabilities who will benefit
will be those who were marginally superior in the first place
(but whose superiority was ignored because of prejudice or stere-
otyping) and those who become marginally superior to employ-
ees without disabilities because of the forced provision of reason-
able accommodations. Although the employer is not permitted to
count the cost of the accommodation in considering the marginal
superiority or inferiority of the job candidate with a disability,
that candidate will still need to be superior to get the job.
B. Limits on the Potential of Education and Rehabilitation
Reformers once had hopes that education for persons with
disabilities would pull them into the mainstream of American
society, both by providing them the skills to succeed in the
workplace73 and by exposing persons without disabilities to the
reality that persons with disabilities are human beings who de-
serve full integration.7 4 In the nearly twenty years of legally
mandated education for all children with disabilities, 5 however,
71. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, The Economic Consequences of Disabil-
ity: A Comparison of German and American People with Disabilities, 5 J. DISABILTY
POL'y STUD. 25, (1994) (stating that longitudinal studies show that elimination of dis-
crimination alone will not eliminate the income gap between those without and with dis-
abilities); see also Steven A. Holmes, In Four Years, Disabilities Act Hasn't Improved
Jobs Rate, N.Y. TmsES, Oct. 23, 1994, at A18 (reporting continuing low employment rate
of persons with disabilities).
72. See G. William Davenport, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of
the Major Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 AL&. L REV. 307,
308 (1992) (describing operation of statute); Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 US.F. L REv. 149, 150 (1992) (same);
C. Geoffrey Weinrich, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 7 LAB. LAW. 27, 28 (1991) (same).
73. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975) ("With proper education services, many would be
able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to re-
main burdens); Darvin L. Miller & Marilee A. Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil
Right as it Relates to the 'Least Restrictive Environment' and Appropriate Mainstream.
ing, 54 INm. LJ. 1, 12 (1979).
74. See, e-g., Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilin-
gual and Special Education, 48 LAw & CONTEmp. PRons 157, 168-69 (1985); Stafford,
supra note 29, at 72; Weber, supra note 31, at 364.
75. In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, guar-
anteeing children with disabilities in all participating states a free, appropriate public
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reformers' expectations have diminished.
The Supreme Court was the first to prick the balloon. In
Board of Education v. Rowley,76 the Court's first decision under
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, the
Court read the Act's requirement that children with disabilities
be afforded an "appropriate" education as guaranteeing nothing
more than meaningful "access" to education.77 Educational pro-
grams would be approved if they conferred "some benefit"; they
need not afford the child with a disability an opportunity to
achieve as much of his or her potential as the child without dis-
abilities would be permitted to achieve. 78
Although subsequent judicial decisions bolstered reformers'
hopes, 79 the reality of daily decision making under the special
education laws should keep anyone from setting those hopes too
high. School authorities tend to place a child into a disability
category and adjust the expectations for the child's achievement
accordingly, even though the federal law calls for an individual-
education in the least restrictive environment. This law is now known as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA, and is codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485
(1994). See generally MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE
1:3-1:4 (1992) (discussing evolution of Act).
76. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
77. Id. at 189-90.
78. Id. at 200-01. Gloomy commentary on the Rowley decision abounds. See, eg.,
Katherine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the Handi-
capped Child, 48 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBS., 7, 9 (Spring 1985); John Myers & William R.
Jensen, The Meaning of 'Appropriate" Educational Programming Under the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act, 42 S. hI U. LJ. 401 (1984); Bonnie P. Tucker, Board
of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12
J. L. & EDuc. 235, 242-43 (1983); Patricia Arcuri, Comment, Handicapped Children:
Statutory Mandate for 'Free Appropriate Public Education" Satisfied When Handicapped
Benefit from Specialized Instruction and Support Services, 14 RuTERns LJ. 989 (1983);
Kenneth G. Anderson, Comment, The Meaning of Appropriate Education to Handicapped
Children Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: The Impact of Rowley
14 Sw. UIL REv. 521, 538 (1984); Margaret Coming Boldrick, Casenote, Free Appropriate
Public Education of Handicapped Children Requires Personalized Instruction and Sup-
port Services to Produce Beneficial Results But Does Not Require Reaching Full Potential
of Handicapped Student, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 425 (1983).
79. Weber, supra note 31, at 377-405 (discussing subsequent caselaw, developments
applying higher standards for educational programs); see also Elena M. Gallegos, Beyond
Board of Education v. Rowley: Educational Benefit for the Handicapped?, 97 Am J. EDuc.
258, 259-60 (1989) (arguing that courts had departed from the Rowley decision in cases
with compelling facts); Mark G. Yudof, Education for the Handicapped.- Rowley in Per-
spective, 92 AM. J. EDuC. 163, 174 (1984) (suggesting that courts might not apply
Rowley's restrictive language); Perry A. Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from
Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L REv.
466, 469 (1983) (same).
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ized education for children with disabilities.80 Parents, for their
part, are reluctant to confront school authorities and demand
what their children need, or they are ground down by the sys-
tem if they make the attempt.
81
Empirical evidence confirms this discouraging impression.
Clearly, the educational state of children with disabilities is dra-
matically better than it was before the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act.82 Equally clearly, students with disabilities
have not made the educational gains that would enable large
numbers to compete on an even plane for scarce employment op-
portunities. Students with disabilities have lower grades than
those without disabilities; more than two-thirds of those who
complete four years of high school fail one or more courses.3 A
disproportionate share of students with disabilities drop out of
high school; many of these students stay four or more years but
fail to obtain enough credits to graduate.8 The proportion of in-
dividuals with disabilities who attend college is less than one-
third of that of individuals who do not have disabilities." Limits
on educational opportunity tend to apply to all disabilities, not
just to mental retardation or other disabilities that might be ex-
pected to impose limits on success in school.86 Indeed, some stu-
80. William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Ed-
ucation For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analy-
sis, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 15, 53 (Winter 1985) (arguing that individual treatment
does not occur and that it is too expensive and not appealing to bureaucratic decision
makers, but arguing for additional monitoring to further it); see also Edna Mora Szy-
manski & Henry T. Trueba, Castification of People with Disabilities: Potential Dis.
empowering Aspects of Classification in Disability Services, J. REHABILITATION, July,
1994, at 12, 16 (analyzing authorities on elementary and secondary special education
and discussing college disability services).
81. See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 185-95 (1991) (citing
studies).
82. This point cannot be overstated. Measured against the fundamental goal of get-
ting basic educational services to children with disabilities, the Individuals with Disabil-
ities Education Act has been an unqualified success. See Alan Gartner & Dorothy
Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality System for All Students,
57 HARv. EDuc. Rnv. 367, 371 (1987) (collecting statistical studies indicating that 650,000
more children with disabilities received educational services in 1985-86 than in 1974-75,
before the law was enacted). The point is simply that the law should not be expected to
eliminate the need for far more aggressive measures to integrate persons with disabili-
ties into the working economy.
83. National Longitudinal Transition Study of Special Education Students, in THE
TRANSmITON EXPERIENCES OF YOUNG PEOPLE wrTH DIsABnrs 2-8 (1993).
84. Id. at 2-9.
85. Id. at 3-18.
86. Engel, supra note 81, at 185 (citing study and interviews concerning children
with mobility impairments); Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barn.
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dents without disabilities have been harmed by being misclassi-
fled as children with disabilities and shunted into low-
expectations programs in which they are segregated from other
children.8
7
Compounding this difficulty is the failure of employment
services for adults with disabilities to reach those with the
greatest need for them. The problem, frequently described as
"creaming," is that rehabilitation services agencies, looking for
quick success, tend to give services to those persons with disa-
bilities who have the least severe problems, and hence are most
likely to be able to move into competitive employment with the
lowest expenditure of resources.88 Although the solution that
Congress has adopted-giving statutory priority to persons with
severe disabilities-has promise,89 the breadth of the definition
of severe disability creates enough discretionary decision making
that the legislative end may be frustrated.9°
The candidate with a disability must be superior to other
candidates (once reasonable accommodations are provided) in or-
der to get the job. But the road to superiority is difficult, with
limited opportunities for training and education. Then the can-
didate must overcome subtle forms of discrimination as well as
the underlying disability itself. Small wonder that so many per-
sons with disabilities lack employment.
ers to the Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L REv. 295, 305
& n.58 (1993) (citing studies and concluding. 'Only a tiny percentage of students identi-
fied as seriously emotionally disturbed perform at or above grade level, and the evidence
shows that they fall farther behind each year they attend school," though only 14% have
intelligence test scores indicating developmental disabilities).
87. See, e.g., DESIGNS FOR CHANGE, CAUGHT IN THE WEB: MISPLACED CHILDREN IN CHI-
CAGO'S CLASSES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 11-24 (1982) (describing misclassification of
children as educable mentally handicapped and their placement in self-contained
programs).
88. 138 CoNG. REc. S16613 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
89. See Mark C. Weber, Towards Access, Accountability, Procedural Regularity and
Participation: The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 and 1993, J. REHABILITATION,
July, 1994, at 21, 22 (discussing priority for persons with severe disabilities and other
procedural innovations in recent amendments to the law governing rehabilitation
services).
90. See 34 C.F.R. § 361.5 (1996) (defining severe impairments as serious limits to
one or more functional capacities in terms of employability, whose vocational rehabilita-
tion will take multiple services over an extended time, and who has one or more of 26
specified conditions or their equivalent). Evidence suggests that half of the states have
not followed the modest requirements in the federal law to establish priorities for ser-
vices, and that funding allows only seven percent of the persons potentially eligible for
rehabilitation services to receive them. David S. Salkever, Access to Vocational Rehabili-
tation Services for Persons with Severe Disabilities, 5 J. DISAaIun' POLY STUD. (citing
General Accounting Office data).
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III. THE ROLE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN COMBATING
UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND STEREOTYPING
The exclusion from the workplace of persons with disabili-
ties, and its likely intractability in the face of existing antidis-
crimination measures, suggest that more aggressive efforts are
needed. To succeed, the efforts will need to be directed against
both of the problems that lead to economic exclusion: discrimi-
nation--especially unconscious discrimination-and the limits
on competitiveness imposed by the disability itself. Only by ad-
dressing these problems will the United States move from a
narrow policy likely to be effective only against certain kinds of
discrimination to a true national employment policy for persons
with disabilities. The first step, that of dealing with unconscious
discrimination, entails the clarification and strengthening of af-
firmative action in employment for persons with disabilities.
A. The Analogy from Affirmative Action to Remedy Race
Discrimination to Affirmative Action for Persons with
Disabilities
Affirmative action is most familiar as a remedy for employ-
ment discrimination on grounds of race or sex. Some efforts
placed under the rubric of affirmative action are modest and
noncontroversial, such as expanding the pool of applicants for
hiring and promotion by outreach efforts and reviewing ordinary
employment qualifications to determine whether they are actu-
ally necessary for the performance of the job.91 In recent years,
these efforts have frequently been reclassified as simple avoid-
ance of disparate impact discrimination rather than affirmative
action.92 The more controversial aspects of affirmative action are
making radical changes in job qualification standards as well as
setting numerical hiring or promotion goals for under-
represented groups and taking whatever steps are needed to
91. See, eg., Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Forming a New Consensus, 45 LAB. L.J. 15, 21
(1992) (describing position of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under chairs
appointed by President Bush).
92. The relationship between the two ideas is close. Reducing artificial barriers to
employment is in some respects an affirmative process and so has frequently been char-
acterized as affirmative action. Moreover, more aggressive affirmative action, like the
imposition of numerical goals, is a broad but effective tool to prevent the discriminatory
impact of employment practices, such a subjective evaluation of candidates, that may
otherwise seem unobjectionable. See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transi-
tion IV Affirmation of Affirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45




find qualified members of the groups to meet those goals.
93
Advocates of affirmative action advance two justifications
for intrusive measures such as numerical targets. The first is
that the employer or its industry has discriminated against the
underrepresented group in the past. Since the particular victims
are unlikely to be found or are no longer in a position to benefit
from the relief, jobs for members of the same underrepresented
group are the next best form of relief.94 An affirmative action
plan, though frequently voluntary,95 carries a justification simi-
lar to that of the relief that courts provide when evidence at
trial shows pervasive, long-term discrimination that has yielded
dramatic underrepresentation of racial minorities or women.9
The second justification for applying numerical systems is
as a means of combating present-day unconscious, undetectable,
or otherwise intractable discrimination. 97 The aff ative action
plan is designed to produce a workplace that is as it would be in
the absence of discrimination.98 If there would be no reason to
expect women or racial minorities to shun the employer or par-
ticular job classifications, or to fail to obtain the qualifications
for the job, then the numbers in the job should be comparable to
those in the relevant labor market.99 Numerical hiring targets
force the employer to produce that result.
93. See, eg. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WA & MARY L
REV. 33, 36-38 (1992) (objecting to affirmative action measures on the ground that they
treat the races unequally, dividing society and detracting from merit-based rewards).
94. See MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFImTIWE ACTION AND JUSTICE 289-304 (1991) (dis-
cussing jurisprudential considerations with regard to remedial justifications for affirma-
tive action measures).
95. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US. 448 (1980) (upholding legislatively en-
acted affirmative action plan on the basis of remedial considerations); United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding collectively bargained affirma-
tive action plan).
96. See, e-g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding remedial or-
der with quotas for promotions as a remedy for pervasive discrimination); Local 28 Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 US. 421 (1986) (upholding court-ordered numer-
ical goals imposed as a remedy for past discrimination when beneficiaries were not nec-
essarily discriminated against).
97. See, e-g., Mary C. Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors-Keeping Score in
the Affirmative Action Ballpark from Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1, 44 (1988) (dis-
cussing justifications for affirmative action based on societal discrimination).
98. As has frequently been noted, the overriding goal of legal remedies is to put in-
dividuals in their positions they would occupy in the absence of wrongdoing. DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14 (1985) (applying principle to compensatory
damages).
99. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: At-
tacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILu L REv. 1043, 1050-54 (1993) (discussing ar-
gument with respect to college and professional school admissions).
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Both justifications for affirmative action apply to persons
with disabilities. First, the legacy of discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities is long and virulent; the discrimination
has been illegal, depending on the employer, for as long as
twenty-three years.100 Particular employers may or may not have
paper records of excluding persons with disabilities. Exclusion is
so pervasive, however, that records should not be expected to ex-
ist. Everyone knew that people who had physical or mental dis-
abilities were not welcome, so none applied. One is reminded of
the schoolmaster's explanation to Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses
that the best means to avoid the scourge of anti-Semitism is to
keep Jews from entering the country.101
Second, unconscious and hidden discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities is widespread.1 02 The attitudes that per-
sons with disabilities are repugnant or evil are not overcome in
a day.103 The widespread use of subjective decision making in
hiring and promotion gives free rein to subtle and not-so-subtle
prejudices against persons with disabilities.1°4
Disability is different from race, of course, in that for many
disabling conditions the disability is not a characteristic that is
part of one's genetic code or one handed down from parent to
child; nor is disability linked to the "peculiar institution" of
chattel slavery. The need for affirmative efforts, however, still
applies. In the first place, it is a remedy provided to the closest
available group of persons for the wrongs suffered by others who
are similar in a relevant respect. It is thus comparable to af-
100. The Rehabilitation Act's antidiscrimination provision came into being in 1973
and affected federal grantees. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (1994)). Federal agencies were covered explicitly in 1978. Pub. L.
No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982 (codified as amended at 29 US.C. § 794(a) (1994)). Larger pri-
vate employers were covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, effective 1992, and
those with as few as fifteen employees were covered as of 1994. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5XA)
(1994).
101. JAMES JoYCE, ULYSSES 36 (Vintage ed. 1961).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
104. See Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
79 MINN. L. REv. 1515, 1543 (1995) (discussing difficulties of proving discriminatory in-
tent in disability cases); cf Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 E2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972)
(discussing subjective decision making in claim based on racial discrimination in employ-
ment); Len Biernat, Subjective Criteria in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title
VI: A Camouflage for Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAVIS L Rsv. 501
(1987) (contending that the use of subjective criteria may mask discriminatory employ-
ment decisions in academia).
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firmative action in race contexts 10 5 as well as to cy pres remedies
in trust adjudication 0 6 and their modern analogues in class ac-
tions when the actual persons who were harmed cannot be
found.107
Second, by guaranteeing that workers with disabilities are
on the job, it alleviates the legacy of discrimination. The long
period in which persons with disabilities have been excluded
from the workplace affects the attitudes of personnel managers,
supervisors, and co-workers, making it more difficult for a per-
son with disabilities to make it inside the employer's doors, and,
if there, to stay. When someone who has long been invisible sud-
denly materializes, others can be expected to act as though they
have seen a ghost. Placing people with disabilities at the work-
place breaks the pattern of exclusion.
Affirmative action on the basis of race has been the subject
of immense controversy.08 Many find the use of racial classifica-
tions distasteful, and fear that continued classification of Ameri-
cans on the ground of race will have lasting negative effects.' °9
They emphasize that racial classifications are properly suspect,
because race rarely correlates to any characteristic that anyone
105. DOUGLAS LAYCOCir supra note 98, at 798 (drawing comparison of remedies
awarded to fluid class composed of next closest group of victims who could be identified
with judicially ordered affirmative action).
106. See generally EDITH L FISCH, TiE Cy PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNrrmn STATES 1
(1950) ("[Cy pres] is a saving device applied to charitable trusts so that when the precise
intention of the settlor cannot be carried out his intention can be carried out as near as
possible.").
107. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967) (consumer class action in
which remedy was provided to closest identifiable group); see also Six Mexican Workers
v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990) (involving comparison to
cy pres in the distribution of damages to a class).
108. Recent decisions on affirmative action in federal contracting, such as Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US. 200 (1995), and on the drawing of election districts,
such as Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), and Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996),
have spawned intense debate by their suggestion that all uses of race by government be
subject to strict scrutiny because of the perceived harmful effects of racial classifications.
Cases barring the use of race in certain decisions concerning higher education have ad-
ded to the controversy. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2580, 2581 (1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), amended on
denial of rehg, 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994). California in 1996 adopted by initiative a con-
stitutional provision barring the state from granting preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin. California
Civil Rights Initiative, CAL CoNST. art. 1, § 31(a). Although a district court entered a
preliminary injunction against the provisions enforcement in Coalition for Economic
Equality v. Wilson, the injunction was later vacated by the Ninth Circuit. Coalition for
Economic Equality v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal 1996), revd 122 F. 3d 692 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
109. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 US. 200.
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has any business considering in employment decisions or gov-
ernmental choices." 0 Supporters of affirmative action counter
that there is no other effective mechanism to eliminate the ef-
fects of prior overt discrimination and current hidden discrimi-
nation."' They argue that use of racial classifications in order to
end racial subordination is not the same as using the classifica-
tions to perpetuate it.112
Whatever one's position on this controversy might be, none
of the arguments against affirmative action on the basis of race
apply to affirmative action on the basis of disability. Ability clas-
sifications are unavoidable in the world of work, and do corre-
late to relevant job classifications. Disability classifications do
not always carry stigma or set off alarms concerning invidious
treatment: although government conduct has harmed those with
disabilities in many instances, government has also established
a long tradition of benign social welfare programs for those with
disabilities."3 Finally, it is impossible to deny that for disability,
if for no other characteristic, perfectly equal treatment can con-
stitute discrimination.1 4 For example, a rule that all persons,
whether blind or not, must take a written admissions test for
law school is discriminatory. In the example, some unequal
treatment for blind persons-use of braille or oral tests or an-
other form of adaptation-is plainly required in order to avoid
invidious discrimination. Once the need for different treatment
is recognized, affirmative action for persons with disabilities
emerges as one of many forms of different treatment that might
be needed to achieve equality. By contrast, many critics of af-
firmative action on the basis of race declare that they would
countenance no form of different treatment for different races,
ever. 1 5
110. See, ag., ANDREw Kuu, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTrrUON 166-81 (1992).
111. See Johnson, supra note 99, at 1043, 1054.
112. See, eg., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L REV. 1707, 1784-
91 (1993). Recent commentary on the subject to combat racial discrimination includes
the following collections: Symposium on Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1731
(1996); Symposium, Group Rights, Victim Status, and the Law,
19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 773 (1996); Symposium, Race-Based Remedy,
84 CAL I. REV. 953 (1996).
113. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US. 432, 444 (1985) (rely-
ing on history of benign governmental programs with developmental disability classifica-
tions to reject application of elevated scrutiny to them for Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection analysis).
114. See Mark C. Weber, ADA Recognizes Formal Equality Is Not Equal Enough, 19
Hum RTS. 2 (1992).
115. See Eastland, supra note 93, at 36-37.
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As a statutory and constitutional matter, affirmative action
on behalf of persons with disabilities is a much simpler question
than affirmative action on behalf of racial minorities. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination on account of
race and sex irrespective of the race or sex of the person being
discriminated against. Thus whites and males whose job oppor-
tunities have been diminished by affirmative action programs
have been able to sue their employers under the statute."6 Simi-
larly, the Constitution affords heightened scrutiny when any-
one--of whatever race-is disadvantaged because of his or her
color.1 7 By contrast, the Americans with Disabilities Act prohib-
its discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities,
conferring no enforceable obligations on employers or other cov-
ered entities to avoid discrimination against persons who do not
have disabilities. Under constitutional principles, absence of dis-
ability is not a suspect classification, 18 and no elevated scrutiny
applies when a disadvantage is attached to that status." 9
B. Distinguishing Affirmative Action from Reasonable
Accommodation
Affirmative action differs from reasonable accommodation in
both degree and character. As for degree, the employer engaged
in affirmative action must take extraordinary measures to elimi-
nate barriers to employability, and must be willing to give sig-
nificant accommodations that impose some degree of hardship
116. See, eg., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 US. 193 (1979).
117. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US. 200 (1995) (holding that height-
ened constitutional scrutiny must be applied to federal program embodying presumptive
preferences for racial minorities); City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (applying heightened scrutiny to local government program with preferences for
racial minorities).
118. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 US. 535 (1972) (upholding welfare statute that
allowed payment of a higher percentage of need for persons with disabilities than for de-
pendent-child families).
119. Similarly, the Court has not imposed elevated constitutional scrutiny on gov-
ernment decisions that confer disadvantage on persons with disabilities, City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US. 432 (1985), although the Cleburne decision,
which invalidated the denial of permission to operate a group home for persons with
mental retardation, might be described as an instance of minimal scrutiny "with bite'
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv. 1 (1972) (discussing cases in which
the Court has applied rational-basis equal protection review in a rigorous manner to in-
validate statutes). In Cleburne, the Court expressed concern that if legislation that clas-
sifies on the basis of mental retardation is subjected to intermediate or other elevated
scrutiny, legislatures might not act at all, foregoing legislation that would benefit the
class. Cleburne, 473 US. at 444.
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on ordinary operations. 120 By contrast, an employer providing
reasonable accommodation for otherwise qualified persons with
disabilities must modify rules, practices, and physical environ-
ments only up to the point where it begins to suffer from undue
hardship.1
21
The character of affirmative action also differs from that of
reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation makes
the person without the disability the norm. The employer makes
modest departures from the rules or the environment to accom-
modate the person who is considered different. This able-bodied
orientation has two effects: identification of the person with a
disability as different, and a corresponding limit on the steps
that the employer must take to depart from the standard of
nondisability.
The first effect is the "dilemma of difference" described by
Professor Martha Minow,2 2 but it appears here in a particularly
insoluble form: all efforts to benefit the person with a disability
inevitably identify that person as different from everyone else.
The effort to make the person equal contributes to the percep-
tion that the person is not. The second effect, the limit on rea-
sonable accommodation, inheres in the term "reasonable" as well
as in the idea that the necessary steps are merely an "accommo-
dation" from the nondisabled norm. Reasonable accommodation
does not require a reorienting of the world around the person
with a disability or an attempt to make the environment confer
an equal benefit on all persons.23 It stops at the point of that
120. See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
121. The obligation imposed on covered employers by the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is to provide reasonable accommoda-
tion for the known disabilities of employees, up to the point where providing the accom-
modation produces undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (Americans with
Disabilities Act); 28 C.F.R. § 42.511 (1996) (Rehabilitation Act regulations). The standard
is a flexible one depending on the needs of the employee and the capacities of the em-
ployer, though some accommodations are specified. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5) (1994); 28
C.F.R. § 42.511(c) (1996). Significant commentary exists on the scope of the obligation.
See, eg., Crespi, supra note 12; Haggard, supra note 12; Mayerson, supra note 12; Wei-
rich, supra note 12. For a history of the adoption of the Rehabilitation Act regulations
that first embodied the reasonable accommodation obligation, see Timothy M. Cook, The
Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under Disa-
bility Civil Rights Laws, 20 LOY. LA L REv. 1471, 1481-1503 (1987).
122. MAIrHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 19-48 (1990). Professor Minow's
book describes the problem and suggests means to alleviate it while addressing the
needs of individuals and groups that are socially characterized as different. See also Mc-
Cluskey, supra note 14, at 871-72 (stating that accommodation standards use people
without disabilities as the norm, placing a deviant status on persons with disabilities).
123. Compare Hahn, supra note 32, at 103 with Mark C. Weber, Comment on Hahn,
Equality and the Environment: the Interpretation of "Reasonable Accommodations" in the
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which can be done without undue financial hardship or basic
changes in the operation of the enterprise.
Affirmative action, though still marking persons with disa-
bilities as different, pushes past the limits of "reasonable" ac-
commodation. The employer must do more than bend rules.
Moreover, to the extent that the affirmative action efforts sim-
ply increase numbers of persons with disabilities at the job site,
the viewpoint of supervisors and coworkers has to shift to one in
which persons with disabilities are part of the working world.
Necessity may cause further invention in job routines to allow
workers with disabilities to succeed. Social perspectives may
shift with the shift in the means of production.
Although mandatory accommodation that far exceeds rea-
sonable standards or imposes an undue hardship might have
some of the same effects as setasides or other measures tradi-
tionally associated with affirmative action, reasonable accommo-
dation has both a different justification and a different effect
than traditional affirmative action programs. Reasonable accom-
modations equalize the position of the person with the disability
and the competitors for employment or other benefits. Unlike af-
firmative action, the reasonable accommodations are not neces-
sarily remedial and do not specifically address the problem of
unconscious discrimination. 24 The operation of the regime is
also different. As noted, under a system of accommodations, the
person with a disability must still demonstrate superiority
under conventional measures (with the accommodation, of
course) in order to get the job. Under a setaside designed to
remedy prior discrimination or present unconscious discrimina-
tion, that is not necessarily the case. In order to meet a numeri-
cal goal, an employer can be required to take an individual who
can do the job even if he or she is not the candidate it would
otherwise choose.
Affirmative action obligations are not limitless. If affirma-
tive action is conceived as a remedy for past or present discrimi-
Americans With Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABI=TATION ADmiu. 107, 108 (1993) (colloquy
on whether reasonable accommodation duty entails an obligation to confer equal benefit
from the work environment on persons with and without disabilities). This point is not
made to denigrate the importance of reasonable accommodation and the incremental role
that it can play in shifting standards for what is considered "normal" and what is not.
See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasona-
ble Accommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 38-40 (1996) (describing potential for reasonable ac-
commodation to redefine norms).
124. Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped The Meaning of Dis-




nation, the nature of the violation should determine the scope of
the remedy.12 5 For affirmative action programs involving job
targets, the targets themselves act as a proxy for what the hir-
ing rate would be under ideal conditions. It may be difficult to
determine what the hiring rates for persons with disabilities
would be in the absence of discrimination, 26 but statistics about
qualified individuals with disabilities in the local economy could
form the starting point, just as they do in plans to remedy race
and sex discrimination.127
For efforts that do not entail numerical targets, other
outside limits might apply. For example, in suits brought under
the affirmative action provisions currently applicable to federal
agencies, the court in granting relief is to take into account the
cost and the availability of alternatives.128 Although the relief
may exceed what would be required under the duty of reasona-
ble accommodation, it would remain less than what would work
severe economic harm on the employer.
C. Existing Affirmative Action Efforts for Persons with
Disabilities
The provisions of federal legislation requiring affirmative
action on behalf of persons with disabilities apply to employ-
ment in federal agencies and federal contractors. Sections 501
(federal agencies) and 503 (federal contractors) were part of the
original nondiscrimination title of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which also includes section 504, a general prohibition of
disability discrimination on the part of federal grantees. The
original regulations promulgated under section 504 by what was
then the United States Department of Health, Education and
Welfare imposed an obligation on the grantees to afford reasona-
ble accommodation in employment, while at the same time bar-
ring disparate treatment, unnecessary practices with a dispa-
125. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 US. 1, 16 (1971) ("TIThe nature of
the violation determines the scope of the remedy.").
126. One commentator has argued that quota-type arrangements are undesirable,
because there is no baseline measure of what participation persons with disabilities
would have in the economy in the absence of discrimination. Michael A. Rebell, Struc-
tural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEo. LJ. 1435, 1456 (1986); see
also Note, Evasiveness, supra note 14, at 1006-08 (emphasizing difficulty with determin-
ing what equal treatment entails with respect to hiring for persons with disabilities).
127. See Baker, supra note 9, at 822-26 (describing practical steps to determine
goals based on characteristics of labor market and nature of jobs).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(aX1) (1994).
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rate impact, and segregation. 9
Congress intended sections 501 and 503 to confer duties
greater than section 504's reasonable accommodation duty on
federal agencies and federal contractors. One important piece of
evidence for this proposition is the passage of all of the sections
at the same time. When Congress wanted to create a
simple prohibition on discrimination, it knew how to do so: no
individual "shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity . .. .11 Congress used much different language in creating
the affirmative action obligations of federal agencies:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality ... in the executive
branch shall... submit... an affirmative action program plan for the
hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities ....
Such plan shall include a description of the extent to which and methods
whereby the special needs of employees who are individuals with disabil-
ities are being met .... [S]uch plan [must] provide] sufficient assur-
ances, procedures and commitments to provide adequate hiring, place-
ment, and advancement opportunities .... 1
Congress did not even include federal agencies in the non-
discrimination provision of section 504 until 1978.132 But when
the Congress did place federal instrumentalities under section
504 at that time, it left the affirmative action provision intact,
even though the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
had adopted regulations explicitly prescribing reasonable accom-
modation duties as part of the nondiscrimination obligation for
entities covered by section 504.13
A basic principle of statutory construction is that every pro-
vision of a statute is to given some meaning; readings, finding
129. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976) (codified at 45 C.F.RI pt. 84 (1978)). For the tortuous
history of these regulations, see Cook, supra note 121, at 1481-1503.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). The quoted language is from the current version of
the statute, which is slightly different from that originally passed in 1973.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1994). Again, the present language of the provision is
quoted. The language of section 503, dealing with government contractors is similar:
"Any contract in excess of $10,000 entered into by any Federal department or agency...
shall contain a provision requiring that the party contracting with the United States
shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals
with disabilities ... !29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1994).
132. Pub. L. 95-602, title I, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987, Nov. 6, 1978.
Some federal courts had questioned the existence of enforceable federal agency nondis-
crimination obligations, spurring Congress to act. Tate, supra note 9, at 786 n. 21.
133. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1996)).
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surplusage are to be avoided. 13' To give the affirmative action
provision meaning, it has to carry obligations different from the
reasonable accommodation obligations of section 504. Signifi-
cantly, it was in the same 1978 enactment that Congress explic-
itly provided that the affirmative action provision applicable to
federal agencies would be enforceable in court under the same
procedures as those used for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.135 Thus at the same time Congress recognized the differ-
ent, higher, obligations imposed on federal agencies and contrac-
tors, it made the higher obligations directly enforceable against
the agencies.
A second persuasive piece of evidence is that when Congress
passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, extending the rea-
sonable accommodation duties imposed on federal grantees in
the Rehabilitation Act to those parts of the United States econ-
omy not already covered, it again left the affirmative action lan-
guage of sections 501 and 503 undisturbed. The Americans with
Disabilities Act takes the language of the section 504 regula-
tions and codifies the obligations against overt discrimination,,
disparate impact discrimination, segregation, and failure to pro-
vide reasonable accommodation found there.136 It does not, how-
ever, borrow the affirmative action language from sections 501
and 503, preserving a distinction between the more limited obli-
gations of reasonable accommodation applicable to all employ-
ment and the greater obligations of affirmative action applicable
to employment by federal agencies and contractors. 13 7 The ac-
tions of Congress based on a given understanding of a law
passed earlier lend force to that understanding of the earlier
law's meaning.138
134. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute[.]' (quoting Inhabitants of
Montclair Township v. Ramsdell, 107 US. 147, 152 (1883)).
135. Pub. L. 95-602, title I, § 120, 92 Stat. 2982, Nov. 6, 1978.
136. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (Americans with Disabilities Act
reasonable accommodation provision) with 28 C.F.R. § 41.54 (1996) (Department of Jus-
tice reasonable accommodation provision, as amended).
137. See generally Cooper, supra note 12, at 1436-37. Cooper notes that
[b]ecause section 501 goes beyond both section 504's and the ADA's require-
ment of nondiscrimination to impose an affirmative action requirement on fed-
eral employers, federal employers clearly could be required under section 501
to make substantial modifications in their programs to ensure sufficient partic-
ipation by individuals with disabilities.
138. One court applied this principle in the context of a Congressional understand-
ing of the meaning of part of the Medicaid law, upon which a subsequently passed part
of the law had apparently been premised: 'Here we have Congress at its most authorita-
tive, adding complex and sophisticated amendments to an already complex and sophisti-
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A final indicator of congressional intent is a portion of the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 concerning section 504
and the employment title of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Although these amendments deal primarily with the federal-
state vocational rehabilitation services program, they include a
provision declaring standards used to determine whether an em-
ployment activity violates the Rehabilitation Act will be same as
those for determining violations of the employment title of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.139 The statute, however, explic-
itly excepts affirmative action complaints from the uniform stan-
dards.140 Congress thus recognized a uniform definition of rea-
sonable accommodation and other duties found in the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, but
also recognized that more could be demanded of federal agencies
and contractors under the affirmative action provisions. 4 '
Nevertheless, false uniformity of rules is a difficult tempta-
tion to resist, particularly for judges and regulators. Almost
from the start, court decisions and regulations have tried to
equate reasonable accommodation and affirmative action obliga-
tions, despite Congress' intentions. Illustrating this false equa-
tion is a government publication describing section 503 and 504.
The pamphlet reads: "Section 503 calls for 'affirmative action.
Section 504 calls for 'non-discrimination.' In practicality, there's
little difference in how they affect you in employment ....
These... programs boil down to this fact: Employers covered by
[either] of them no longer may screen out handicapped people
simply because of their disabilities."42 The Americans with Disa-
cated act. Congress is not merely expressing an opinion on a matter which may come
before a court but is acting on what it understands its own prior acts to mean." Mount
Sinai Hospital v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 343 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (discussing the role of subsequent legislative ac-
tivity in the construction of the statute).
139. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 506, 106 Stat.
4344, 4345 (codified at 29 US.C. § 794(d) (1994)).
140. Id. The statute provides:
The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a
complaint alleging [nonaffirmative action] employment discrimination under
this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and
510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as such sections relate to
employment.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
141. Subsequent legislative activity is reliably consulted in determining the proper
meaning to be assigned unclear legislative provisions. See sources cited supra note 138.
142. PRESIDENT'S Co mi. ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR DISABLED PEOPLE: A POCEr GUIDE 2-3 (1978).
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bilities Act, following the regulations promulgated under section
504, defines screening as a component of prohibited discrimina-
tion under that statute. Affirmative action goes far beyond the
obligation not to impose discriminatory screens.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also ap-
pears to have missed the distinction. Its regulations promul-
gated pursuant to section 501 are essentially identical to the
substantive provisions governing section 504.143 The regulations
under section 503 are primarily procedural, but to the extent
they have a substantive content, it resembles that of the section
504 rules.'" Since Congress did not amend section 504 to explic-
itly bar federal agencies from discriminating on the basis of dis-
ability until five years after section 501 passed, the regulators
were apparently concerned with establishing a construction of
section 501 that entailed a general nondiscrimination obligation,
including the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. This
preoccupation seems to have kept them from making the dis-
tinction between the lower obligations of accommodation under
section 504 and the higher ones under section 501. In an early
administrative decision, the agency nonetheless applied a high
standard of accommodation to federal employers.145
There is little excuse for the mistaken identity given the
Supreme Court case law on section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The Supreme Court's first case under the section 504
spelled out the distinction between reasonable accommodation
and aTmative action. Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis' 46 upheld a decision of a community college not to modify its
nurses' training program to permit a student who was deaf to
complete the clinical portion of the work.1 47 The Court noted
that section 504 required some accommodations, but argued
that the requested accommodation would amount to affirmative
action, and that affirmative action was more than Congress
wished to force upon states and localities 48 In making the argu-
ment, the Court contrasted the limited duty of reasonable ac-
commodation with the greater, affirmative action obligations im-
143. Compare 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-.709 (1995) (section 501 rules) with 29 C.ER.
§ 1614.203 (1995) (section 504 rules).
144. See 41 C.FR. § 60-741.6(d) (1995) (reasonable accommodation provision).
145. Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 485 (M.S.P.B. Spec.
Panel 1986) (requiring reassignment of employee who could no longer perform existing
job).
146. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
147. Id. at 414.
148. Id. at 410-11. The Court did, however, distinguish the more limited obligations
owed by grantees from the aifirmative action obligations owed by federal agencies. Id.
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posed on federal agencies by section 501.149 By using section 501
as a foil for section 504, the Court established that the accom-
modations required under section 501's affirmative action re-
gime are greater than the reasonable accommodations required
under section 504.150
In 1985, in Alexander v. Choate,'5 ' the Court responded to
criticism of Davis's characterization of extensive accommodation
efforts as "affirmative action." The Court upheld an annual limit
on days of Medicaid-covered hospitalization, which was said to
have a greater negative impact on persons with disabilities than
on persons without disabilities, and which lacked a justification
to make it superior to other forms of budget control with a
lesser impact. 52 In discussing Davis's language about accommo-
dations and affirmative action, the Court said that the case
meant to exclude from the requirements of section 504 only fun-
damental alterations in programs. 5 3 This interpretation left un-
changed the basic reasoning of Davis that affirmative action ob-
ligations under section 501 carry an obligation to do more to
accommodate individuals with disabilities' 5' than do the obliga-
tions of section 504.15
149. Id.
150. See id. at 411 ("A comparison of these provisions [sections 501 and 504] demon-
strates that Congress understood accommodation of the needs of handicapped individu-
als may require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in those instances
where it wished to do so").
151. 469 US. 287 (1985).
152. Id. at 309. However, the Court distinguished the adverse impact case it re-
jected from claim of adverse impact in areas such as architectural barriers, transporta-
tion, job qualification, and education. It recognized that section 504 reached adverse im-
pacts in these areas. Id. at 295-99.
153. Id. at 300-01 & n.20. The Court further developed this reasoning in School
Board v. Arline, 480 US. 273, 289 n.19 (1987), which distinguished the affirmative obli-
gation to make reasonable accommodations from affirmative action as used in other con-
texts. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 1431-35 (explaining distinction).
154. See Tate, supra note 9, at 801-02. Tate explains:
Because the Court has ... made clear that the federal employer's duty is
greater than that of the grantee-employer, courts must set the test for the
mandated "reasonable" accommodation under section 501 at a higher level of
effort than that required under section 504. In the Court's words, the requisite
level of change, adjustment, or modification can be "substantial" and might
even involve "fundamental alteration[s]."
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 US. at 300 n.20).
155. In School Board v. Arline, 480 US. 273 (1987), a case holding that a school
teacher with tuberculosis was covered by section 504, the Court played with Davis' lan-
guage one more time, by calling the statute's requirement an "affirmative obligation to
make a reasonable accommodation." Id. at 289 n.19. The Court, however, did not retreat
from the basic point that the affirmative action obligations of section 501 carry a more
stringent duty of accommodation than the reasonable accommodation obligations of sec-
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The better reasoned decisions of the lower courts hold fed-
eral agencies sued under section 501 to standards higher than
the section 504 standards of reasonable accommodation. An ex-
ample is Judge Pollak's decision in Taylor v. Garrett.15 6 In Tay-
lor, the court found that a Navy rigger who because of a back
injury could no longer do the essential functions of his original
job could be entitled to reclassification into a permanent light-
duty job, an accommodation the Navy had refused to provide.m7
The court emphasized that section 501 places higher standards
on a federal agency than section 504 places on a federal
grantee.m 8 Looking to the Supreme Court precedent that con-
trasted section 504 and section 501 as well as to commentary on
section 501, the court concluded that the elevated obligation im-
posed by section 501 could require an agency to consider an em-
ployee's fitness to perform jobs other than that which the em-
ployee previously occupied. 159 The limit of required
accommodation would be that a worker need not be placed in a
position if the worker could not perform its essential func-
tions;1' in the section 501 context, that would constitute undue
hardship for the employer.161
Some cases overturning agency or lower court decisions re-
jecting plaintiffs' requests for particular accommodations rely
heavily on precedent from courts applying ordinary reasonable
accommodation obligations, but they nonetheless state that an
elevated duty to accommodate exists under section 501.162 Still
tion 504.
156. 820 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
157. The decision was a denial of the defendant's motion for partial summary judg-
ment. The propriety of the accommodation remained open for resolution in evidentiary
proceedings. See id. at 938 (discussing state of record).
158. Id. at 935 n.3, 936.
159. Id. at 937-38 & n.5. As the court noted, the Navy's position was particularly
weak, for it had transferred the employee to a temporary light-duty job to diminish its
workers compensation exposure, but failed to consider his eligibility to keep the job over
the long term. Id. at 939.
160. Id. at 940.
161. See id. A case similar to Taylor in its approach though with a more compact
discussion of the section 501 affirmative action duty is Meisser v. Hove, 872 F. Supp.
507, 517-19 (ND. Ill. 1994) (adopting magistrate judge's recommended findings of fact
and conclusions of law) in which the court, applying a high standard of accommodation,
ruled that the FDIC unreasonably withheld promotion opportunities from a deaf bank
examiner when accommodations such as additional training and restructuring of duties
and assignments could have enabled him to advance.
162. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 E2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) The court in Mantolete found
that
[i]n addressing federal employers and contractors, Congress chose to use the
term "affirmative action" and to require employers to make "reasonable accom-
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other courts reject requests for accommodations while neverthe-
less recognizing that federal agencies are under greater duties
to accommodate by virtue of the affirmative action provision.163
Unfortunately, other judicial opinions are hardly faithful in
observing the distinction between affirmative action and reason-
able accommodation obligations under existing law. One court'64
has suggested that the sole difference between section 501 and
504 causes of action is that the burden of persuasion rests on
the employer in an affirmative action case but on the employee
with a reasonable accommodation case.165 This charges affirma-
tive action with a meaning somewhat stronger than that of rea-
modation" wherever possible; it was clearly implying that a more active and
extensive effort than 'non-discrimination" must be made to eliminate barriers
to employment of the handicapped in federal agencies, departments, instru-
mentalities and contractors.
Id. at 1422. See also Johnson v. Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (D. Md. 1991) ('Fed-
eral agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, have responsibili-
ties beyond the non-discrimination requirements of Section 504; under Section 501 of the
Act, federal agencies must undertake affirmative action on behalf of the handicapped.!),
rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993); Wal-
lace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 760-61 (D. Kan. 1988) (stating that the fed-
eral government must be a model employer and structure procedures and programs to
afford equal opportunity); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 302 (5th
Cir. 1981) (federal government 'model employer"); Ryan v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
565 F.2d 762, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (federal government must structure procedures and
programs to ensure equal opportunity for persons with disabilities).
163. While acknowledging that section 501 places a higher standard of accommoda-
tion on a federal agency than that imposed on a federal grantee under section 504, the
court in Davis v. United States Postal Service, 675 F. Supp. 225, 231, 234 (M.D. Pa.
1987), ruled that the statute did not require placement of a job applicant with a disabil-
ity in a non-entry level post not open to him under an applicable collective bargaining
agreemeiit and regulations. In Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1425 n.8 (D. Conn.
1987), the court recognized a distinction between affirmative action under section 501
and "evenhanded treatment" under section 504, but went on to rule that a person with
achondroplastic dwarfism need not be provided the accommodations he requested to per-
form the job of postal distribution clerk. See id. at 1428.
Dancy v. Kline, No. 84 C 7369, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2336, at *7 (N.D. il. Mar. 23,
1987) also recognized a greater accommodation duty for federal agencies, declaring that
'with Section 791 Congress sought to impose a greater obligation on federal employers
than that which is placed on recipients of federal funds through Section 794," though the
court ultimately rejected the claim that the General Services Administration had a duty
to reassign a law enforcement officer with disabling back pain to a light duty job. These
rejections of particular accommodations do not undermine the central point that a fed-
eral agency is to held to a higher standard in providing accommodations than a federal
grantee.
164. Overton v. Reilly, 977 E2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992) (leaving open whether affirma-
tive action provision conferred additional obligations).
165. Id. at 1193. Later in the opinion, the court concedes that section 501 may im-
pose greater substantive obligations than section 504 does, but states that it need not
decide the issue. Id. at 1194.
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sonable accommodation as the term has been interpreted by a
few cases applying section 504,166 but it makes the term indis-
tinguishable from reasonable accommodation as it is interpreted
by other courts167 and as it is codified in Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which places the burden on the em-
ployer.168 Making affirmative action overlap in this fashion is not
true to the congressional intention to have affirmative action be
a higher obligation than reasonable accommodation.
Even more erroneous in its approach is the recent decision
Fedro v. Reno,169 in which the court, following the decisions of
various cases interpreting section 504, ruled that the obligation
of reasonable accommodation did not include the duty to place a
former deputy marshal who had contacted hepatitis while on
the job in an alternative position in which the risk of contami-
nation of others from his blood would not be significant.170 The
employee proposed that he be placed in a full-time job combin-
ing two part-time positions as a background investigator. 7' The
court conceded that the proposal was both feasible and cheaper
to the government than providing workers compensation to the
employee, but said there was no obligation to provide it.172 Judge
Ilana Rovner protested in a partial dissent that the court was
wrong to rely thoughtlessly on precedent under section 504
when section 501 affords federal employees "substantially
greater rights."173 The duty under the law to become a model
employer of persons with disabilities entails the obligation to
make substantial changes and fundamental alterations in pro-
grams.174 Reassignment is part of the federal government's "af-
firmative obligation to expand the employment opportunities
available" to workers with disabilities.'7 5
166. See, eg., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F2d 761, 775-77 (2d Cir. 1981).
167. See, eg., Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1386-87 (10th Cir.
1981).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5XA) (1994) (defining discrimination as failing to make
reasonable accommodations 'unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship....').
169. 21 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994).
170. Id. at 1395.
171. Id. at 1394.
172. Id. at 1396.
173. Id. at 1398 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
174. Id.; f. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (stating that the federal government shall be the
'model employer" of individuals with disabilities).
175. Id. at 1401 (Rovner, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the EEOC and
other federal administrative authorities have taken the position that federal employers,
under their section 501 obligations, must consider reassignment of employees unable to
do their former jobs. Id. at 1399-1400 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (citing Ignacio v. United
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The Fedro majority is not an isolated opinion. Other courts
have also equated reasonable accommodation and affirmative
action obligations, usually without any discussion whether the
federal agency is under a higher standard.178 Some commentary
interpreting this caselaw has similarly underplayed the differ-
ence between affirmative action under section 501 and reasona-
ble accommodation.
177
D. Strengthening Existing Affirmative Action Obligations
Strengthening current affirmative action efforts will help
American society address the problems of past and present disa-
bility discrimination, especially unconscious discrimination. The
first step to strengthening existing affirmative action law is for
courts in their decisions and the EEOC in its regulations to rec-
ognize the higher obligations that sections 501 and 503 impose
on federal agencies and contractors. Courts need to appreciate
the wisdom of cases such as Taylor v. Garrett78 and apply simi-
lar interpretations to section 501 cases coming before them.179
The EEOC should take a page from the courts and replace its
existing section 501 and 503 regulations with provisions that
States Postal Serv. 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (M.S.P.B. Spec. Panel 1986), Ellis v. United States
Postal Serv., 37 M.S.P.R 503, 508-09 (M.S.P.B. 1988), and UNrrED STATES OFFMCE OF PER
SONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, OPM Doc. 720-A, at
10 (March, 1980)).
176. See, eg., Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.,
Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994); Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs.,
959 F. 2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Johston v. Home, 875 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). It might
be argued that the court in Langon, by reversing a decision rejecting the accommodation
that a computer programmer with multiple sclerosis be permitted to work at home, was
tacitly applying a higher standard than ordinary reasonable accommodation. Courts ap-
plying the reasonable accommodation duty in cases under section 504 have resisted forc-
ing employers to allow employees to work out of their homes. See, e-g., Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cim 1995); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs.,
Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
177. See Gray, supra note 12, at 295 n.7 (expressing view that the antidiscrimina-
tion sections of the Rehabilitation Act are interchangeable). But see Tate, supra note 9,
at 801-02 (contending that section 501 imposes higher accommodation duties on federal
agencies); see also Cooper, supra note 12, at 1436-37 (arguing that section 501 goes be-
yond Section 504's nondiscrimination requirement to impose an affirmative action re-
quirement on federal employers).
178. 820 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For a discussion of the case, see supra text
accompanying notes 156-161.
179. The courts might adopt such an approach based on policy grounds rather than
statutory ones, such as the idea that the government can more easily spread costs and
may have economies of scale if it routinely makes accommodations not offered by other
employers. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 123, at 34.
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recognize the elevated duties federal agencies and contractors
are under.
As a second step, the language that the regulators adopt
should more explicitly embrace numerical employment goals. In
combating disability discrimination, as in combating discrimina-
tion based on race and sex, the one form of afirmative action
that is most likely to be successful is the use of employment
targets, both for entry-level jobs and promotions. Persons with
disabilities cannot show their abilities unless they are present
in the workplace. All the obvious ingredients for greater success
in the workplace are already present: The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act already requires employers to review job qualifica-
tions to eliminate those that discriminate against persons with
disabilities; many employers say that they are engaging in out-
reach and recruitment activities; persons with disabilities want
to work. Yet persons with disabilities are still not in jobs. To
overcome the subtle and less-subtle discrimination that remains
as a barrier, numerical targets are needed.
While goals and timetables have long been part of federal
equal employment opportunity regulations promulgated under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,180 which forbids racial,
ethnic, religious, and sex discrimination, 181 the regulations
promulgated under section 501 have no comparable require-
ments and are all but identical to the nondiscrimination regula-
tions promulgated under section 504.182 The section 503 regula-
tions are almost totally procedural, dealing with complaint
processing rather than with the actual content of what is re-
quired from federal contractors in the way of afIrmative activ-
ity.13 Once again, goals and timetables escape mention.184 Regu-
lations comparable to those that exist for Title VII should be
adopted for sections 501 and 503.
Clear regulations requiring goals and timetables would
strengthen federal afirmative action efforts. The adequacy of af-
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1994).
181. The relevant regulatory provision, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4(c) (1996), provides that
reasonable action taken to correct employment practices with discriminatory effects in-
dude "goals and timetables or other appropriate employment tools which recognize the
race, sex, or national origin of applicants or employees."
182. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-,707 (1995), 1614.203 (1996) (implementing section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
183. 48 C.F.R. §§ 22.1400-.1408 (1996). See generally Baker, supra note 9, at 817-26
(proposing that federal contractors be required to adopt steps with regard to hiring, of
persons with disabilities comparable to affirmative action plans to combat race
discrimination).
184. See sources cited supra note 183.
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firmative action plans adopted by agencies and contractors could
be measured against the steps called for in the goals and time-
tables regulations. Individuals suing in court or employers de-
fending there could point to compliance or noncompliance with
the standards. Of course, the standards must retain some flexi-
bility for particular circumstances, but they need be no more
vague than the ordinary standard of reasonable accommodation
is.185 The elevated duty of reasonable accommodation that ap-
plies under the affirmative action obligation must also remain
somewhat vague because of the variety of circumstances that
both employees and employers may find themselves in.
A third step to enhance the enforceability of the affirmative
action obligation that applies to federal contractors would be en-
acting a private right of action. Although the statute is phrased
in mandatory terms,1 86 the present consensus of the courts is
that it confers no right of action on which the aggrieved em-
ployee or job candidate can sue. 8 7 Unlike its counterpart requir-
ing affirmative action by federal agencies, section 501, the fed-
eral contractor provision is not included in the remedies section
of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.18 The legislative history of
the 1992 Rehabilitation Act Amendments affirms the ability of
individuals to sue to enforce section 504,189 the general nondis-
crimination provision, against federal agencies, but does not ex-
tend the cause of action to persons suing contractors, leaving
185. Some commentators have decried the vagueness of reasonable accommodation
standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act and asked for a numerical formula
that places a limit on what the employer must do. See, eg., Steven B. Epstein, In Search
of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Pinancial Hardship Becomes Undue
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L Ray. 391, 397 (1995) (citing diffi-
culties of vague standards); George C. Dolatly, Note, The Future of the Reasonable Ac-
commodation Duty in Employment Practices, 26 CoLUm J. L & Soc. PaOBs. 523, 548-50
(1993) (proposing ex ante assessment of costs and ability to pay in determining undue
hardship); Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination (pt. IH)--The Americans
with Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential, 109 HARv. L REv. 1602, 1616-17
(1996). Congress, however, rejected formulas for reasonable accommodation, doubting
that they would accomplish the goal the law was designed to achieve. See Burgdorf,
supra note 12, at 517-18 (describing legislative process).
186. 29 US.C. § 793 (1994) (%Any contract in excess of $10,000 ... shall contain a
provision requiring that [in employing persons to carry out such contract] the party con-
tracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment qualified individuals with disabilities....").
187. See, eg., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); Stephens v.
Roadway Exp. Co., 37 Fair Empl Pran Cas. (BNA) 1104 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Biltz v. North-
west Orient Airlines, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 275 (Minn. 1981).
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(aXl) (1994).
189. 138 CONG. BWa. S16609 (statement of Sen. Jeffords), S16611 (statement of Sen.
Harkin); S16613 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
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the employees of federal contractors without a remedy. A cause
of action against federal contractors by their employees and ap-
plicants would create no more problems than does the parallel
action that exists against the federal agencies. It would go far in
alleviating the current situation in which the right to affirma-
tive action efforts lacks any reliable remedy.'m
E. Expanding Affirmative Action for Persons with Disabilitiess
While affirmative action should be strengthened where it
currently applies, it should also be expanded to areas in which
it does not. Unconscious discrimination and the legacy of past
discriminatory practices are hardly unique to federal agencies
and federal contractors. The two logical expansions of affirma-
tive action for persons with disabilities are imposing the obliga-
tion on state and local governmental entities, and imposing the
obligation on private employers.
1. Affirmative Action by State and Local Government. It
would take only a slight modification of the existing statute to
impose the same affirmative action obligations on state and lo-
cal government that now apply to federal agencies. State and lo-
cal government currently employ 15.5 million Americans, more
workers than those employed in the manufacturing of durable
goods and roughly twice the number of those employed in the
manufacture of nondurable goods.191 Thus requiring states and
localities to engage in affirmative action would have a signifi-
cant impact on the employment of persons with disabilities.
State and local governments are responsible for the legislation
that has been most oppressive and discriminatory towards per-
sons with disabilities.192 They continue to labor under the effects
of past discriminatory practices;193 as is the case with other em-
ployers, their employment decisions are subject to unconscious
190. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ('The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.").
191. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 405-07 tbl. 645 (1992).
192. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (describing discriminatory laws).
This point is hardly surprising, for the states have had primary responsibility over most
domestic policy for the bulk of United States history.
193. See Mikochik, supra note 12, at 624 n.33 (collecting authority from legislative
history of the Americans with Disabilities Act regarding employment discrimination by
states and localities).
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or other undetectable discrimination. 194 Accordingly, the same
affirmative action requirements that apply to the federal gov-
ernment should apply to them. The adequacy of their efforts
should be measured by the same standards, both with respect to
the accommodation they offer and the goals and timetables they
establish and fulfill.
The step proposed here is not without precedent. An affirm-
ative action obligation applies to all state and local educational
agencies that receive federal funding for special education of
children with disabilities. The obligation extends to the employ-
ment of individuals with disabilities, and requires actions be-
yond what section 504 or the Americans with Disabilities Act
would otherwise entail. 19 5 This requirement has not given rise to
widespread dissatisfaction or reports that it is not workable.J9
The measure would be well within congressional authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.197 The Amendment compels states to provide the equal
protection of the law to all persons within their jurisdiction; per-
sons with disabilities receive the benefit of the equal protection
clause, just as everyone else does198 Congress has authority to
enforce the Amendment with appropriate legislation. 199 This
power is exceedingly broad,2 0 and does not depend on any find-
194. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42, 48-51.
195. See Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa
1984).
196. The absence of difficulty may stem from the fact that the obligation is limited
by the "otherwise qualified" standard. See Pandazides v. 'Virginia Bd. of Educ., 804 F.
Supp. 794 (E.D. Va. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding
special education teacher with record of learning disability not 'otherwise qualified" for
position). See generally supra text accompanying note 127 (discussing operation of "oth-
erwise qualified" standard in affirmative action plans).
197. The courts that have considered the matter so far have ruled that the existing
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act are constitutional with respect to the
duties they impose on state and local government. See, eg. Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F.
Supp. 1497 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
198. See, e-g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US. 432 (1985) (find-
ing that requiring group homes for mentally retarded persons to apply for and obtain a
special use permit violates the equal protection clause).
199. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
200. As Professor Mikochik notes, "If federal power under the 14th amendment is
broad enough to nullify state voter restrictions, ballot designations, and the form of local
government itself, it is plainly sufficient to address discrimination in all positions of
public employment." Mikochik, supra note 12, at 625-626 n.44 (citations omitted). The
recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) does not undermine
this conclusion. In City of Boerne, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993), exceeded congressional power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. RFRA prohibits states and localities from sub-
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ing by the judiciary or another body that the evil proscribed by
the legislation violates the Amendment. 2 1 As previously noted,
since the absence of disability is not a suspect classification, no
heightened constitutional scrutiny applies. 202 The Supreme
Court has ruled that congressional action to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment is able to override any restrictions on fed-
eral court remedies that would otherwise apply under sovereign
immunity principles embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.203
2. Affirmative Action by Private Employers. Private em-
ployers, too, should be subject to affirmative action obliga-
tions.20 ' Congressional action to elevate the duty of reasonable
stantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even unintentionally or by a rule of
general application, unless the state or locality can show that the burden furthers a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means to further that inter-
est. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162. The Court emphasized that RFRA was an at-
tempt to interpret the First Amendment in a manner contrary to that which the Court
had adopted in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that the
First Amendment did not require government to show that laws of general applicability
furthered such interests by the least restrictive means. Id. at 2160-61. The Court reaf-
firmed, however, that Congress may enforce constitutional rights 'even if in the process
it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.'" Id. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). Imposing affirmative action obligations on state and
local government does not enact a particular interpretation of the Equal Protection
clause, much less an interpretation contrary to that adopted by the Supreme Court. On
the contrary, affirmative action measures are means of enforcement of nondiscrimination
obligations already binding on states and localities. The Court recognized an analogous
distinction in City of Boerne by contrasting RFRA with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
US.C. § 1973b (1994), which enacts broad prophylactic measures against discrimination
that compare closely to affirmative action in the context of employment. City of Boerne,
117 S. Ct. 2169-70. As with the Voting Rights Act, and again in contrast to RFRA, the
affirmative action obligations suggested in the text would be imposed against a back-
ground of pervasive intentional discrimination. Cf id. at 2171 (discussing impetus be-
hind RFRA of combating alleged unintentional discrimination due to government action
found permissible in Employment Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
201. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1965). This conclusion is left undis-
turbed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). See generally supra note 200
(discussing City of Boerne).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
203. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 US. 445 (1976). This precedent is unaffected by the
Court's recent decision that congressional action under the Commerce Clause does not
overcome the state governments' immunity from federal court remedies. See Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
204. A subset of private employers that would be the very minimum that ought to
be included in this regime consists of those employers that receive federal financial as-
sistance, such as universities and federally funded nonprofit agencies. The government
can place any conditions on receipt of funds that it chooses, so long as the conditions
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accommodation and to impose goals and timetables would not be
an easy political achievement, but the likelihood of success is
fair. An exhaustive study of the legislative process that led to
the Americans with Disabilities Act commented that the propo-
nents of the law could have enacted a stricter law, given the
high level of support that they had for the measure that
passed.20 5 For advocates of disability rights, the Act is an exam-
ple of compromising too easily.2 6 While the vagaries of congres-
sional politics are beyond the scope of this paper, affirmative ac-
tion measures are a worthy legislative goal.
The reason that affirmative action by private employers, is
worthy is the same reason that federal action is justified and
states and localities' obligations ought to be enhanced. Persons
with disabilities need employment both from government and
from the private sector to overcome poverty and integrate them-
selves into society as a whole. Private employers have been
guilty of discriminating against persons with disabilities in the
past, and they will continue to do so in subtle ways in the fu-
ture unless more aggressive steps are taken.
Congress has the power to impose affirmative action obliga-
tions on private employers under its authority to regulate inter-
state commerce.20 7 While the power may not extend to some of
the very smallest entities whose actions have no effect whatso-
ever on interstate economic activity,20 8 it is extremely broad
with respect to any business conduct.20 9 It was broad enough to
permit Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964,210 whose
provisions cover employers with as few as fifteen employees, 21
and which compels affirmative action under a variety of circum-
themselves do not violate an independent constitutional guarantee. See infra text accom-
panying notes 220-25. In return for federal dollars, the recipients ought to be obligated
to engage in affirmative action on behalf of persons with disabilities.
205. Burgdorf, supra note 12, at 518-22.
206. See id. at 521.
207. See U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8, cl 3 (Commerce Clause).
208. But see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942) (finding that Congress could
regulate the amount of wheat grown for home consumption on a farm under the Com-
merce Clause).
209. Significantly, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which found that a
congressional enactment passed under Commerce Clause authority exceeded the power
granted there, involved neither commercial activity nor a statutory requirement that the
actor be engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 1624.
210. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 US. 294 (1964) (upholding public accommodations
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 under the Commerce Clause when applied to res-
taurant with seating capacity of 220 and payroll of 36).
211. 42 US.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
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stances. 212 It would permit the legislation proposed here.
IV. BEYOND AFFIRMATvE ACTION: NONREMEDIAL SETASIDES IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
A strengthened regime of affirmative action would be effec-
tive at combating the conscious and unconscious discrimination
that keeps qualified individuals with disabilities out of work and
in poverty. But more than discrimination stands in the way of
economic self-sufficiency for persons whose disabilities are real
and severe, as opposed to perceived or mild. Many disabilities,
particularly mobility limits and serious sensory deficits, do in
fact make it more difficult for the persons with them to compete
in the workplace. This does not make the individuals produc-
tively useless or unable to contribute economically. But it does
mean that more than antidiscrimination efforts will be needed
to achieve the employment of this group.
213
Nonremedial setasides are needed to make a significant im-
pact on the employment of persons with more severe disabilities.
Nonremedial setasides entail reserving a certain percentage of
jobs, or of jobs within a given classification, for persons whose
disabilities reach a defined level of severity. Setasides of this
type go beyond affirmative action in degree, and are different in
character. Even when affirmative action includes numerical
targets for hiring, the plan remains a means to avoid discrimi-
nation, albeit by a somewhat wider berth than might be re-
quired by rules that lack the numerical goals. Nonremedial em-
ployment setasides are something more. At the risk of sounding
facetious, the something might be termed "unreasonable accom-
modation," the limit of which goes beyond undue hardship to in-
clude hardship that, though real, is "due" in order to finally in-
tegrate persons with more severe disabilities into the American
workplace.
212. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (up-
holding the plan imposed by the district court). Although the constitutionality of this
duty which might be subject to doubt with respect to race under recent cases challenging
government affirmative action programs, for example Adarand Constructors, In v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the heightened scrutiny that applies to racial classifications
does not apply to disability cases, and so the proposal advanced here does not present
the same problem. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
213. It is not argued here that the proposed steps will entirely eliminate the need
for social insurance and welfare. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: the
Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. RIv. 361 (1996) and ten-
Broek & Matson, supra note 24 for extensive discussions of the role of these measures in
the reform of the law that affects people with disabilities.
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A. Nonremedial Setasides in Federal Employment
Nothing would be more due than for the federal govern-
ment, the "model employer" of persons with disabilities,214 to
adopt nonremedial setasides, reserving percentages of jobs for
persons with serious disabilities. Persons with disabilities would
contribute to the efforts of the government, while no longer re-
quiring the welfare outlays that the federal government pro-
vides. No problem could be anticipated with the constitutionality
of a law of this type. Minimal scrutiny applies to federal social
and economic legislation,215 and federal hiring can be used to
serve any national priority Congress chooses.
B. Nonremedial Setasides in Employment by State and Local
Governments Receiving Federal Funds
Next in line after federal government are state governmen-
tal agencies that receive federal money. These entities ought to
join in the effort to bring persons with disabilities into the eco-
nomic mainstream. Like the federal government, these govern-
ments will benefit by the product of the persons at work and by
the reduction in the need for welfare assistance. Percentage
setasides that would apply to the states would be modeled on
those made applicable to the federal government. The size of the
agency and the nature of its work would need to be considered
in calibrating the obligation to be imposed.
Some doubts may be raised concerning the constitutionality
of this measure. In New York v. United States,2 1 the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress could not impose obligations on state
governments without their consent; the Commerce Clause of Ar-
ticle I and the Tenth Amendment forbid "commandeering" state
governments for federal purposes.2 -7 To do so diminishes the ac-
countability of federal and state decision making, for voters are
unable to determine whether to blame their congressional or
state representatives for bad legislative choices.2 18
The New York v. United States Court, however, carefully
distinguished conditional spending from direct imposition of du-
ties.219 In an unbroken line of cases from Steward Machine Co. v.
214. 29 C.FR § 1614.203 (1996) (stating that the federal government shall be the
"model employer' of individuals with disabilities); see also sources cited supra note 162.
215. United States R.P. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
216. 505 US. 144 (1992).
217. Id. at 175-76.
218. Id. at 182-83.
219. Id. at 188; see also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (ruling that
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Davis20 to South Dakota v. Dole,2 1 the Supreme Court has es-
tablished that Congress may place conditions on funding that it
provides to states.
Congress does not evade accountability when it employs
conditional spending measures. The state or local official who is
taken to task for following the federal directive can properly
blame Congress, and Congress has no credible means for shift-
ing the blame back to the states. Of course, state and local offi-
cials~can be-and should be-taken to task for the decision they
themselves make: to take the money under the federal condi-
tions or to forego it.
Using the conditional spending power sidesteps the
problems that might be present were Congress to impose seta-
side obligations on states and localities by fiat under Commerce
Clause or Fourteenth Amendment authority. However, if
nonremedial setaside requirements were imposed on private
business, they could be imposed on state and local agencies that
do not receive federal funding. New York v. United States distin-
guished cases such as Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,224 which upheld the application of minimum
wage laws to state employees, on the grounds that rules that
apply uniformly to both state governments and private busi-
nesses do not exceed Congress' Commerce Clause powers.2
C. Nonremedial Setasides in Private Employment
It took nearly twenty years for the United States to impose
the same disability discrimination provisions on private employ-
ers as it had imposed on public employers receiving federal
Congress could not compel local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks
on handgun purchasers).
220. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
221. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
222. For recent commentary on the constitutional propriety of conditional spending
see David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994); Albert J. Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987). Limits
discussed in the literature remain hypothetical at the present time.
223. This is not to deny that the decision to forego the funding can be political sui-
cide, or that the federal government might lack the courage to force the decision on fund
recipients. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson once suggested withdrawing federal spending
from states that disobeyed federal desegregation directives. President Kennedy, fearing
such a measure would erode his base of support among southern Democrats, responded
by sending Johnson on a good-will tour of Scandinavia. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTNG THE WA.
TERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 863-64 (1988).
224. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
225. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160-61.
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money. The failure to cover private employment prevented
meaningful progress from being made with respect to eliminat-
ing discrimination in the economy as a whole. In order to have a
real policy of promoting employment for persons with disabili-
ties, setasides would need to be extended to private employ-
ment, where new legislation should put them into place.226
Much of the rest of the industrialized world imposes quotas
on private industry to force businesses to hire persons with dis-
abilities. 227 Austria requires employers with twenty-five or more
employees to hire at least one person certified as having a disa-
bility for each twenty-five employees. 228 France makes firms
with more than ten workers allocate ten percent of vacancies to
persons with disabilities;2 29 employers with at least twenty
workers must have full or part-time employees with disabilities
totaling six percent of their workers.210 Germany has a six per-
cent quota for hiring persons with severe disabilities, and im-
poses it on all public and private employers;23l those workers
are specially protected against termination of employment once
they have served a probationary period.232 Luxembourg forces
employers with fifty or more employees to reserve two percent of
staff positions for workers with disabilities.
2a3
In the Netherlands, companies negotiate their standards,
but the government may compel the employment of between
226. Again, a subset of private employers for whom the obligations might be more
easily imposed are those that receive federal financial assistance. See supra note 204
and accompanying text.
227. These programs are effective in bringing persons with disabilities into the eco-
nomic mainstream. In Germany, for example, the income of men with disabilities before
tax and transfer payments is nearly ninety percent of that of men who do not have disa-
bilities; in the United States, the comparable figure is forty percent. Burkhauser & Daly,
supra note 71, at 45. The American number may be slightly exaggerated due to the
prevalence of disability among persons who had previously had low incomes before they
became disabled and due to the time-limited nature of some sources of support. Id. In
addition to the sources cited below, a useful survey of programs outside the United
States is NEIL LUNT & PATRICIA THORNTON, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES FOR DISABLED PEOPLE:
A REvIEw OF LEGISLATION AND SEviCEs IN FIFTEEN COuNTRIES (1993).
228. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Is THE LAW FAIR TO THE DISABLED? A
EUROPEAN SURVEY 17 (Genevieve Pinet ed. 1990) [hereinafter WHO].
229. Id. at 84.
230. Eric A. Besner, Comment, Employment Legislation for Disabled Individuals, 16
Cor p. LAB. L.J. 399, 403 (1995) (noting loopholes and underenforcement of quota).
231. Id. at 403; see also Richard V. Burkhauser, Lessons from the West German Ap-
proach to Disability Policy, in DISABMrY AND WORK, supra note 11, at 85.; Carol D. Ras-
nic, A Comparative Analysis of Federal Statutes for the Disabled Worker in the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States, 9 AEIZ, J. INT'L & COMP. L 283, 299 (1992).
232. WHO, supra note 228, at 128.
233. Id. at 188.
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three percent and seven percent persons with disabilities if a
firm's voluntary performance is not satisfactory.m' In Spain, two
percent of jobs are reserved for workers with disabilities in com-
panies with more than fifty employees. - The United Kingdom
has a three percent quota for workers certified as having a disa-
bility for all employers with twenty or more workers.236 Japan
has an employment quota for persons with disabilities of 1.5%
for profit-making businesses and 1.8 to 1.9% for public entities
and nonprofit organizations.2 7
Some flexibility exists in most of these countries for firms to
make payments to the government if they do not meet their
quotas in a given month.238 In some countries, subsidies are
available for specialized equipment or other additional costs of
hiring persons with disabilities.2 9
The presence of these programs elsewhere in the world
proves a number of points about setaside programs for persons
with disabilities. First and most obviously, placing such a sys-
tem into effect in the United States will not cause us to suffer
competitive disadvantage in the world economy. We would
merely be doing what our competitors now do. We may lose
some modest advantage we currently have, but other countries
will not be able to gain any special edge over us. Moreover,
strictly in monetary terms, we will gain the value of the product
of the persons added to the workforce, their taxes, and the pub-
lic savings from their decreased need for welfare assistance.
Where appropriate, portions of these resources might be reallo-
cated to enhance the competitiveness of businesses threatened
by foreign competition.
Second, it is workable to shift the costs of employment of
persons with disabilities to private employers. Placing the costs
on the private sector spurs economic actors to develop the low-
est cost means of accomplishing the job.Y4 Problems of defining
234. Id. at 208.
235. Id. at 259.
236. Id. at 331.
237. Dong W. Cho, Japanese Model Factory Employment of Handicapped Persons, 5
EVALUATION REv. 427, 429 (1981).
238. See WHO, supra note 228, at 17 (Austria), 128 (Germany;, reporting $124 mil-
lion in penalty payments in 1983); Cho, supra note 237, at 429 (Japan).
239. See WHO, supra note 228, at 84 (France), 129 (Germany), 188 (Luxembourg,
salary supplement inversely related to marginal economic contribution); 271 (Sweden;
applying subsidies and negotiated employment arrangements); see also Burkhauser,
supra note 11, at 87 (discussing German wage subsidy for probationary period and pay-
ments for costs of job accommodations).
240. See C.E. FERGUSON & S. CHARMS MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 394 (rev. ed.
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disability, financing costs, and policing compliance, though they
may be quite real,2'1 have not proved severe enough to cause the
European countries or Japan to abandon their initiatives.
Third, imposing the costs on business is legitimate, by the
standards of global economic fairness. It might be argued that
setaside programs for persons with disabilities are unfair to bus-
iness by charging them the entire cost of fixing a social problem
they did not create.2  However, the question of who bears the
cost of disability is an open one. Majoritarian processes of gov-
ernment are right to modify existing entitlements when doing so
will best accomplish social objectives, 2 particularly in a situa-
tion such as this one in which the employers, by definition, have
a monopoly on the scarce commodity of employment. The burden
imposed is a measured one, and is likely to be kept modest both
for political reasons and in order to allow the employers to stay
profitably in business and thus provide the needed jobs.
All of this is not to argue that nonremedial setasides will
solve the dilemma of difference by shifting the national view of
what is disability and what is not.244 A workable program of
setasides will need definitions of disability and will classify indi-
viduals accordingly. Employees without disabilities are highly
likely to consider the individuals freshly hired to satisfy the
quota as something other, and quite possibly something lesser,
than themselves.
1974) (describing operation of market mechanisms when costs are internalized).
241. See Rebell, supra note 14, at 1456 (criticizing the use of numerical goals for
hiring of persons with disabilities).
242. See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 487-94 (also arguing against imposition of rea-
sonable accommodation obligation without compensation); Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives
Versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABHIIY & WORK, supra note 11, at 3,
15.
243. It is erroneous to think that the existing distribution of social responsibilities
is sacred, an unchangeable baseline. See Cass . Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM.
L REv. 873 (1987) (contending that the failing of the pre-New Deal Supreme Court con-
sisted not of judicial activism, but of the aggressive effort to maintain an existing base-
line of rights and entitlements that favored certain economic actors). A fairer baseline
would be equality of opportunity to succeed, regardless of physical or other conditions
that one has no control over, with departures from the standard of equality only to pro-
vide necessary incentives to benefit the community as a whole. See JOHN RAwls, A THF
ORY OF JUSTICE 12-17 (1971) (explaining theory of justice as fairness based on initial po-
sition of equality); Gray, supra note 12, at 351 (comparing obligations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act to those that might be applied under Rawls's equality-based the-
ory); see also Bolla, supra note 40, at 983-87 (applying Rawls's ideas to disability dis-
crimination law).




Two compensations will exist, however. The first is the
sheer fact of exposure. Being exposed to the reality that persons
with disabilities are in the world and part of it should, over
time, bring changes in the way others view reality. - The modi-
fications in physical space and workplace routines that employ-
ers will find it economical to undertake should aid this process.
The second compensation is, frankly, compensation. Nothing
so much affects one's acceptance by others as one's economic sta-
tus,m and although workers whose disabilities limit their mar-
ginal product will be at the lower end of the wage scale, they
will be on a much higher economic plane than they are now.
Workers whose disabilities are unrelated to success at work will
gain entry-level jobs and the opportunity to prove themselves
over time. The economic improvement should translate into im-
provement in how individuals are treated.
An additional objection to nonremedial setasides is that
they will lead to featherbedding or make-work jobs that contrib-
ute little to the employer's product and provide no opportunity
for advancement. But the economic incentive for employers is to
gain whatever marginal contribution the employee can make,
and not to leave the employee idle. Employers are the ones in
the best position to determine exactly how to achieve the maxi-
mum benefit. Workers with more severe impairments may be
limited in their opportunities to advance, but it is to be hoped
that as workers with disabilities become more of an ordinary
part of the work experience, those with the capacity to rise will
do so. The employer will have the incentive to undertake
changes in the work settings and practices so as to maximize
the economic contribution of the workers who are there.
Commentators have proposed other strategies for enhancing
the employment opportunities of persons with disabilities. Some
propose full or partial subsidies for employers' voluntary modifi-
cations of workplaces and workplace routines.2A Tax incentives
exist to defray some of the cost of accommodations,24 but with
245. See Laudor, supra note 12, at 943 (describing benefits of making persons with
disabilities more visible in public settings).
246. WORK IN AhmICA, supra note 25, at 34-36.
247. See Sue A. Krenek, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX L. REv. 1969,
2012-13 (1994) (proposing that the government pay for employee-specific accommoda-
tions in order to promote fairness and eliminate disincentives to hire the person needing
the accommodation); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 493 (proposing limited govern-
ment funding for accommodations).
248. LR.C. § 44 (1994) provides tax credits to small businesses for accommodation
expenditures; 21,476 applications have been approved, for a total credit of $36.47 mil-
lion. Tony Coelho, Employing People with Disabilities Makes Good Business Sense, R-
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all of today's competing demands for government aid, subsidies
are unlikely to increase. Significantly, European countries,
which typically tax citizens and businesses at a much higher
rate than the United States does and spend proportionally more
government money on social programs, impose the costs of em-
ploying persons with disabilities on employers. Subsidies are fre-
quently present, but they defray only a fraction of the employ-
ers' costs. 249
As with nonremedial setasides to be applied to federal and
state governmental agencies, regulations would need to embody
flexibility and attention to the nature of the enterprise being
regulated. In particular, the regulations would need to establish
rating mechanisms for the severity of the disability of persons
hired, to keep employers from creaming off persons with the
least serious disabilities and counting them towards their seta-
sides in a manner that is equal to that used for persons with
much greater severity of disability.2 0
Just as the Commerce Clause is the simplest ground on
which to uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action ef-
forts imposed on private employers, so to would it be for
nonremedial setasides. The same principles would all apply, as
would the basic principle that absence of disability is not a sus-
pect classification triggering heightened scrutiny. Although not
in the form of a tax, a regulation of the type proposed is not
much different from a tax, or from minimum employee benefits
such as family medical leave or minimum wage. Real costs are
being placed on employers, but for a valid social goal. Real costs
are already imposed on employers under the duty to provide
reasonable accommodations, and although the proposed measure
will entail greater costs, quotas along European models are not
GION V NEWS (Great Lakes Disability and Business Technical Assistance Center), Fall,
1996, at 1. Deductions are also available for some barrier removal expenses. See I.PC.
§ 190 (1994); David Harger, Comment, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommo-
dation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reducing the Ef-
fects of Ambiguity on Small Businesses, 41 KAN. L Rav. 783, 803 (1993) (describing tax
subsidy programs).
249. See, eg., sources cited supra notes 227-239 (describing European programs).
250. The severity of disability is rated for purposes of determining amounts of ser-
vice-connected veterans' disability benefits and amounts of workers' compensation. See
38 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (establishing percentage ratings and benefits for wartime disa-
bility compensation for veterans). A similar plan could be put into place with respect to
the obligations borne by employers. There might be disparity of hardship under such a
plan, for companies whose product is intellectual might fill their quotas easily by hiring
individuals with mobility impairments while manufacturing concerns may have a more
difficult time. Adjustments could be made for these concerns in the administration of the
plan.
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high enough to produce serious economic discomfort for employ-
ers. Special hardship exceptions could be created were there a
serious risk of this result.
CONCLUSION
The steps proposed in this Article represent the beginning
of a true employment policy for persons with disabilities, as op-
posed to the present patchwork of antidiscrimination laws with
limited affirmative action requirements, limited educational and
rehabilitation services, and subsistence welfare. Proper interpre-
tation and broader application of affirmative action efforts are
needed to complete the work of eliminating discrimination and
its effects, but nonremedial setasides will be needed to bring
persons with disabilities into the working economy and out of
poverty and dependency. The steps proposed here take persons
with disabilities seriously as members and potential members of
the working community.
